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BACKDOOR PURPOSIVISM 
ANITA S. KRISHNAKUMAR† 
ABSTRACT
It has become standard among statutory interpretation 
commentators to declare that, “We are all textualists now.” The 
comment stems from the observation that in the modern, post-Scalia 
era, all of the Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court pay significant 
attention to statutory text when construing statutes and, relatedly, that 
legislative history use by the Court as a whole has declined since its
heyday in the 1970s. The account of textualism’s triumph is so prevalent 
that some scholars have declared purposivism—or at least traditional
purposivism—essentially defunct. Two prominent textualist scholars in
particular have suggested that there is a “new purposivism” at work on 
the modern Court and that this purposivism is textually constrained,
limiting its focus to the means identified in the text of the statute rather
than the underlying policy objectives motivating the statute—or, 
alternately, using purpose as a threshold consideration in determining 
whether a statute’s text is ambiguous in the first place.
This Article challenges the conventional “purposivism is dead or
dying” narrative in two important ways. First, relying on data from an 
empirical analysis of 499 Roberts Court statutory interpretation cases
decided between 2006 and 2017, it argues that traditional purposivism
is alive and well on the modern Supreme Court. That is, while 
purposivist Justices in the modern era do pay attention to text and 
invoke textual canons in a way that their 1970s purposivist counterparts
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1276 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:1275 
did not, modern purposivists have not abandoned the traditional
purposive approach of identifying a statute’s policy objective and 
adopting the construction that best fits that objective. On the contrary, 
modern purposivists regularly invoke statutory purpose, intent, and
legislative history—even if the Court as a whole does not. Second, and
perhaps more importantly, the Court’s textualist Justices have been 
quietly engaging in a form of purposive analysis that comes closer to
traditional purposivism than scholars and jurists have recognized. That 
is, the textualist Justices regularly have been using pragmatic reasoning, 
as well as traditional textual canons such as noscitur a sociis and the 
whole act rule, to impute a specific intent or policy goal to Congress. 
This practice, which I call “backdoor purposivism,” goes beyond using 
text as the best evidence of statutory purpose and entails significant
judicial guesswork and construction of legislative purpose and intent.  
The Article suggests that, in the end, there may be less distance 
between textualists and purposivists than the old debates suggest—but 
because textualists have embraced purpose and intent in unexpected
ways, rather than because, or merely because, purposivists have 
become more text focused. It concludes by advocating that both 
textualists and purposivists employ interpretive resources outside their
preferred toolkit to check the accuracy of their initial statutory readings 
and to curb the influence of their inherent personal biases.
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2020] BACKDOOR PURPOSIVISM 1277 
INTRODUCTION
In the thirty-some years since the late Justice Scalia joined the U.S. 
Supreme Court and began waving the textualist flag, it has become in
vogue to chronicle the Court’s move toward a highly textualist 
approach to statutory interpretation. Scholars have, for example, noted 
a discernible decline in the rate at which the Court invokes legislative 
history,1 a marked increase in its use of dictionary definitions to
interpret statutes,2 and a rise in its use of both linguistic and substantive
canons of construction.3 Indeed, the primacy of text in modern
statutory interpretation has led some commentators to proclaim that 
purposivism has lost the interpretive battle to textualism, suggesting
that even the Court’s purpose-preferring Justices have tamped down 
their reliance on interpretive tools disfavored by textualists—namely, 
purpose, legislative history, and intent—in favor of a “textually-
constrained” approach to purposive analysis.4 Modern purposivism,
they contend, looks distinctly different from the purposivism that 
prevailed in the 1970s, during the heyday of purposive analysis. One
prominent scholar, for example, argues that purposivist Justices have
shifted their focus from the statute’s “spirit” or “ulterior purpose” to a
much narrower inquiry: identifying the statute’s “implemental
1. See, e.g., James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Decline and Fall of Legislative History?
Patterns of Supreme Court Reliance in the Burger and Rehnquist Eras, 89 JUDICATURE 220, 220
(2006); Michael H. Koby, The Supreme Court’s Declining Reliance on Legislative History: The
Impact of Justice Scalia’s Critique, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 369, 369–70 (1999); Charles Tiefer, The 
Reconceptualization of Legislative History in the Supreme Court, 2000 WISC. L. REV. 205, 220;
Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court
Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 207 (1983); see also James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of 
Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 35–36 (2005)
[hereinafter Brudney & Ditslear, Canons of Construction] (describing a decline in the Court’s use 
of legislative history and a corresponding increase in the use of canons of construction). 
2. See, e.g., James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Oasis or Mirage: The Supreme Court’s 
Thirst for Dictionaries in the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 483, 486 
(2013); Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier & Samuel A. Thumma, Scaling the Lexicon Fortress: The United
States Supreme Court’s Use of Dictionaries in the Twenty-First Century, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 77, 80
(2010). 
3. See, e.g., Brudney & Ditslear, Canons of Construction, supra note 1, at 5.
 4. See, e.g., John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 118, 129
[hereinafter Manning, New Purposivism]; see also Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of
Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 35–36 (2006) (“[W]e have all become textualists.”); Jonathan
R. Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism in Administrative Law, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1023, 1057 (1998)
(“In a significant sense, we are all textualists now.”); Harvard Law Sch., The Scalia Lecture: A 
Dialogue with Justice Elena Kagan on the Reading of Statutes, YOUTUBE (Nov. 25, 2015),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dpEtszFT0Tg [https://perma.cc/DPZ8-F48D] (including
Justice Kagan’s statement that, thanks to Justice Scalia’s influence, “we’re all textualists now”).











    
 
   











    










1278 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:1275 
purpose.”5 Another contends that the Court uses purpose as a 
threshold tool for identifying textual ambiguity, rather than as an 
independent interpretive inquiry that can trump clear statutory text.6 
This Article breaks from the emerging consensus about modern 
purposivism in two important ways. First, it argues that while those
Justices commonly considered purposivists do pay significant attention 
to statutory text in a way that was less common in the pre-Scalia era,
they do so as a supplement, rather than a substitute, to traditional
purposivism.7 Second, and more critically, it reveals through doctrinal 
analysis that those Justices commonly considered textualist or 
textualist leaning8 at times engage in a form of backdoor purposivism,
or at least speculation about legislative intent, that looks surprisingly
similar to the intent speculation inherent to traditional purposivism.  
This Article is the first to expose and chronicle the decidedly 
purposivist and intentionalist9 undertones to the Roberts Court’s use
of textualist canons, interpretive tools, and practical consequences 
arguments.10 Other scholars have noted that the Court has taken a
5. See Manning, New Purposivism, supra note 4, at 146–48. As discussed in Part I.A, infra, 
Manning defines “implemental purpose” to refer to the legislature’s choices about how much
discretion the statute gives interpreters to carry out its “ulterior” purpose or “spirit.” Id.
 6. See Richard M. Re, The New Holy Trinity, 18 GREEN BAG 2D 407, 417 (2015) (explaining 
that whereas “the Old Holy Trinity maintained that even concededly clear statutory text must
give way to legislative purpose,” under the New Holy Trinity theory, the “key move is to view
purposive and pragmatic considerations as relevant to the identification of textual clarity or
ambiguity”).
 7. See infra Part II.B. 
8. For a detailed explanation of which Justices fall into this category, see infra Part II.B. 
9. Here, and elsewhere in this Article, the terms “purposivist” and “intentionalist” are used
in tandem, although they represent two distinct interpretive philosophies. Purposivism seeks to
identify Congress’s policy goal or aim and to select the statutory reading that best fulfills that goal
or aim. Intentionalism seeks to identify Congress’s specific intent regarding whether the facts at
issue in the case are meant to fall within the statute’s scope. Although these two interpretive
approaches are theoretically distinct, in practice they often tend to bleed into one another. That
is, purposivists and intentionalists tend to rely on the same interpretive resources—e.g., legislative 
history, background mischief motivating the statute—to identify Congress’s purpose or intent,
and, particularly where a specific congressional intent regarding the statutory application at issue 
in the case is lacking, the two inquiries can overlap significantly. Because this Article is concerned
with examining how the Supreme Court practices statutory interpretation on the ground, rather
than with how purposivism or intentionalism theoretically instructs the Court to interpret statutes,
these two interpretive approaches—and their corresponding searches for Congress’s purpose 
versus intent—are treated together.
10. Because this Article focuses in part on the practices of individual Justices, many of the
citations to the Court’s cases will identify the author of the opinion.











   
    
  
    
    
    
  
    
 
    
 
  
   
   
      
2020] BACKDOOR PURPOSIVISM 1279 
purposivist turn in some of its recent, high-profile cases;11 that the
Court as a whole regularly relies on precedent and practical 
considerations when interpreting statutes;12 and that prominent 
textualist Justice Scalia regularly referenced purpose and practical 
consequences in his dissenting opinions.13 This Article reveals a 
different judicial practice, one more subtle than openly employing 
purpose or intent to evade a seemingly clear statutory text, and more 
expansive than using text to limit or constrain purpose: the Court, and 
its textualist Justices in particular, regularly employ pragmatic 
reasoning as well as supposedly neutral textualist tools to divine—or 
manufacture—congressional purpose and intent. This is significant 
because it goes beyond merely relying on text as the best evidence of 
legislative purpose or intent—a practice textualists have long 
advocated—and ventures into the realm of speculation, where judges
simply guess at, or assert, Congress’s actual purpose or intent based on 
personal intuition. This in turn suggests that far from textualism 
constraining purposivism, textualist jurists may in fact be engaging in 
purposivism by other, hidden means. This hidden purposivism,
moreover, may actually be more dangerous—in the sense of
empowering judges to decide cases in accordance with their own 
ideological or policy preferences—than traditional purposivism, 
because it is untethered to external constraints such as statements 
documented in the legislative record or the preamble of a statute. 
11. See Re, supra note 6, at 409–15; Rick Hasen, King v. Burwell: The Return of “Purpose” 
in Statutory Interpretation, ELECTION L. BLOG (June 25, 2015, 8:33 AM),
https://electionlawblog.org/?p=73760 [http://perma.cc/KK47-332P]; Marty Lederman, Supreme
Court 2015: John Roberts’ Ruling in King v. Burwell, SLATE (June 25, 2015, 4:26 PM),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2015/06/supreme-court-2015-john-roberts-ruling-in-king-v-
burwell.html [http://perma.cc/44HE-QKR3]; see also Michael C. Mikulic, The Emergence of
Contextually Constrained Purposivism, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 128, 128 (2016) (“After years of 
the Court’s drift towards new textualism, King v. Burwell reaffirms that purposivism still has
relevancy . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
12. See, e.g., Anita S. Krishnakumar, Reconsidering Substantive Canons, 84 U. CHI. L. REV.
825, 886–87 (2017) [hereinafter Krishnakumar, Reconsidering Substantive Canons]; Jane S.
Schacter, The Confounding Common Law Originalism in Recent Supreme Court Statutory 
Interpretation: Implications for the Legislative History Debate and Beyond, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1, 1
(1998) [hereinafter Schacter, Confounding Common Law]; Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of
Authority in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical Analysis, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1073, 1093–97 
(1992). 
13. See Miranda McGowan, Do As I Do, Not As I Say: An Empirical Investigation of Justice
Scalia’s Ordinary Meaning Method of Statutory Interpretation, 78 MISS. L.J. 129, 171–76 (2008);
Jane S. Schacter, Text or Consequences?, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1007, 1010–14 (2011) [hereinafter
Schacter, Text or Consequences?]. 
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The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I reviews textualism’s 
position on legislative purpose and intent and examines recent 
commentary about the changing face of purposive analysis on the 
modern Supreme Court. Part II provides empirical and doctrinal data 
from the Roberts Court’s first twelve terms, revealing that, contrary to 
recent speculation by some scholars, purposivist Justices still regularly
rely on straightforward, “ulterior” purpose and intent analyses in the
cases they author. Part III shows that although the textualist Justices 
do not explicitly invoke statutory purpose or intent at high rates, they 
often employ practical reasoning, language canons,14 and the whole act 
rule15 in ways that impute purpose and intent to Congress. That is, the
textualist Justices regularly speculate about legislative purpose and
intent through other interpretive tools—a practice that this Article
terms “backdoor purposivism.” 
Part IV then explores the theoretical implications of textualist 
Justices’ backdoor inferences about statutory purpose and intent. It 
argues that such indirect purposive analysis enables just as much 
judicial discretion as the purposivist interpretive tools that textualists 
decry—but under the guise of neutral, objective linguistic or canon-
based analyses. Part IV also suggests that, in the end, there may be less 
distance between textualists and purposivists than the old debates 
suggest—but because textualists have embraced purpose and intent in
unexpected ways, rather than because, or merely because, purposivists 
have become more text focused. Part IV concludes with the
recommendation that, given the speculation inherent in the application 
of even the most text-based interpretive canons, textualists should 
check the accuracy of their statutory interpretations against 
interpretive resources such as the legislative history and mischief or 
problem that motivated the statute even when they think the text is clear. 
14. By “language canons” I refer primarily to the Latin maxims ejusdem generis and noscitur
a sociis, which are defined in infra notes 94–95 and accompanying text.
15. The “whole act rule” refers to a canon that directs interpreters to construe individual 
provisions of a statute in light of the whole statute and its larger structural context. WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY, ELIZABETH GARRETT & JAMES J. BRUDNEY, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND REGULATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC
POLICY 674 (5th ed. 2014). The whole act rule is based on a “holistic” approach to interpretation:
A provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder
of the statutory scheme—because the same terminology is used elsewhere in a context
that makes its meaning clear, or because only one of the permissible meanings produces
a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law.
United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988) (citations
omitted).
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2020] BACKDOOR PURPOSIVISM 1281 
Likewise, purposivist Justices should use textual canons and tools to
supplement and check the interpretive inferences they draw from the
legislative record or the mischief that motivated the statute. 
I. HOW TEXTUALISTS TALK ABOUT PURPOSE AND INTENT
Because the contours of textualism and purposivism are not 
always precisely agreed upon, it is necessary at the outset to define how 
this Article employs these terms. Textualism, as used throughout the 
Article, refers to a formalist method of statutory interpretation that 
regards the enacted text of a statute as the primary source of statutory
meaning. Textualists view the legislative process with cynicism, 
emphasizing that a multimember body cannot have a single, discernible 
“intent”;16 that statutes are difficult to enact and are often the product 
of messy legislative compromises that courts should not unsettle;17 and 
that legislative history is unreliable because legislators and their staff 
have powerful incentives to manipulate it.18 Accordingly, textualists 
seek to identify the plain, objective meaning of the statute’s official 
language using text-based interpretive tools such as dictionary
definitions, linguistic and grammar canons, or structural inferences
about how different sections of a statute fit together—and reject 
judicial inquiry into atextual sources of meaning such as legislative
history, intent, and statutory purpose.19 Many textualists also argue 
that only the enacted text of a statute is a legitimate source of law 
because only the enacted text is the product of the constitutionally 
mandated processes of bicameralism and presentment—and refuse to 
consider external evidence of a statute’s purpose or legislative intent 
for this reason as well.20 
16. See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in  A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 30 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). 
17. See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 18
(2001) [hereinafter Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute].
 18. See Scalia, supra note 16, at 30–36. 
19. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1287, 1288
(2010) (“Textualism maintains that judges should seek statutory meaning in the semantic import
of the enacted text and, in so doing, should reject the longstanding practice of using unenacted
legislative history as authoritative evidence of legislative intent or purpose.”); Scalia, supra note 
16, at 16–17, 34–35 (“The committee report has no claim to our attention . . . . A statute, however, 
has a claim to our attention simply because . . . it is a law.”).
 20. See Scalia, supra note 16, at 22, 35 (“The text is the law, and it is the text that must be 
observed.”).
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The term purposivism, by contrast, is used in this Article to 
describe an interpretive approach that directs courts to “[i]nterpret the
words of the statute . . . so as to carry out the purpose as best [they] 
can.”21 Purposivism has historically been associated with the Legal 
Process movement22 and differs from textualism both in its focus on
identifying a statute’s underlying purpose or policy objectives and in its 
willingness to consider a range of extrinsic interpretive aids, including 
legislative history. As Professor Abbe Gluck notes, “purposivists 
generally feel freer to go beyond the confines of statutory text and will 
not necessarily find that text trumps contradictory evidence of
purpose.”23 Despite this willingness to prioritize purpose over text
when the two conflict, the purposivism discussed here is not the 
equivalent of legal realism—in which the interpreter essentially makes 
up a purpose that she deems appropriate or necessary.  
As with many dichotomies, the differences between textualism 
and purposivism are less stark than their classic portrayal suggests. 
Thus, although textbook textualism emphasizes interpreters’ 
constitutional duty to give effect to the duly enacted text rather than 
unenacted evidence of the legislature’s purpose,24 modern defenders of 
textualism note the need for context when construing statutes—and
embrace a range of extratextual aids that provide such context.25 
21. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1374 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip
P. Frickey eds., 1994).
 22. See Peter L. Strauss, The Courts and the Congress: Should Judges Disdain Political
History?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 242, 246–47 (1998). 
23. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological
Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1764 (2010). 
24. See Scalia, supra note 16, at 16–18, 23, 25; see also United States v. Gudger, 249 U.S. 373,
374–75 (1919) (“No elucidation of the text is needed to add cogency to this plain meaning . . . .”); 
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (“Where the language is plain and admits of
no more than one meaning, the duty of interpretation does not arise . . . .”); Proctor & Gamble
Co. v. United States, 225 U.S. 282, 293 (1912) (“No resort to exposition can add to the cogency 
with which the conclusion stated is compelled by the plain meaning of the words themselves.”).
 25. See, e.g., In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1342 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J.) (explaining 
that statutory texts must be understood in light of “their contexts—linguistic, structural, 
functional, social, historical”); John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 70, 80 (2006) [hereinafter Manning, What Divides] (“Because context of course
is essential even to determine the way words are used in everyday parlance, textualists (like
everyone else) necessarily resort to context even in cases in which the meaning of the text appears
intuitively obvious.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 81 (stating that textualism requires interpreters to
“consider specialized conventions and linguistic practices peculiar to the law,” including terms of
art, common law understandings, and off-the-rack canons of construction recognized by the legal
community); Scalia, supra note 16, at 17 (explaining that judges should “look for a sort of








   
        
 
 
     
    
  
   
  
 
    




        
  
     
  
 
    
   
       
 
 
    





2020] BACKDOOR PURPOSIVISM 1283 
Further, although modern textualists criticize judicial reliance on 
interpretive tools such as legislative history, statutory purpose, and 
congressional intent, they do not deny that legislative purpose is a 
relevant and important consideration in statutory interpretation.26 
Rather, they contend that judges should derive such purpose from the
statute’s text and the surrounding corpus juris instead of from 
legislative history or guesses about legislative intent.27 Similarly,
although classic purposivism is often characterized as directing courts 
to privilege the spirit over the letter of the statute,28 modern
purposivists regularly pay close attention to statutory text.29 The most
salient remaining difference between the two interpretive approaches 
appears to be that purposivists are willing to reject a statute’s seemingly 
‘objectified’ intent—the intent that a reasonable person would gather from the text of the law,
placed alongside the remainder of the corpus juris”). 
26. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION 
OF LEGAL TEXTS 20, 56 (2012) (“The difference between textualist interpretation and so-called
purposive interpretation is not that the former never considers purpose. It almost always does.”);
Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 61, 61 (1994) (“Words take their meaning from contexts . . . [including] the problems
the authors were addressing.”); John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 
2387, 2408 (2003) [hereinafter Manning, Absurdity Doctrine] (“Textualism does not purport to
exclude all consideration of purpose or policy from statutory interpretation.”); Manning, What
Divides, supra note 25, at 84 (“Because speakers use language purposively, textualists recognize
that the relevant context for a statutory text includes the mischiefs the authors were addressing.”);
Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 355 (2005) (describing how textualists
defend interpreting statutory provisions “in light of their apparent purposes”).
 27. See  SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 26, at 34 (“[I]n a fair reading, purpose—as a 
constituent of meaning—is to be derived exclusively from a text.”); Manning, What Divides, supra
note 25, at 79 (explaining that textualists look for an “‘objectified’ intent—the intent that a
reasonable person would gather from the text of the law, placed alongside the remainder of the
corpus juris” (quoting Scalia, supra note 16, at 17)); Nelson, supra note 26, at 355 (“[T]extualists
freely admit that statutory provisions should be interpreted in light of their apparent purposes, as
long as those purposes can be gleaned from evidence of the sort that textualists permit
interpreters to consider.”). 
28. See, e.g., Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892) (stating
that the “letter” of a statute must yield to its “spirit” when the two conflict); see also Ozawa v.
United States, 260 U.S. 178, 194 (1922) (“We may . . . look to the reason of the enactment and 
inquire into its antecedent history and give it effect in accordance with its design and purpose,
sacrificing, if necessary, the literal meaning in order that the purpose may not fail.”); Pickett v.
United States, 216 U.S. 456, 461 (1910) (“The reason of the law, as indicated by its general terms,
should prevail over its letter, when the plain purpose of the act will be defeated by strict adherence 
to its verbiage.”). 
29. Part II explores in detail the specific interpretive tools relied upon by the Roberts Court’s
purposivist Justices, revealing both that traditional purposivism is alive and well on the modern
Court and that the purposivist Justices regularly weave textual analysis into their purposive
arguments.
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plain meaning when contrary indications of purpose cut strongly 
against such meaning.30 
This Part focuses on textualism’s approach to statutory purpose in 
two important ways. Section A examines what textualist jurists and
theorists have said about the role that statutory purpose and intent
should play in the judicial interpretation of statutes, focusing
specifically on the argument, made by some sophisticated textualists,
that the “best evidence” of a statute’s purpose and intent is the statute’s 
text rather than external sources. Section B explores two arguments 
advanced by prominent textualist scholars speculating about a “new 
purposivism” that they suggest has evolved in the text focused, post-
Scalia era. In contrast to traditional purposivism, which directs 
interpreters to identify the purpose or problem the statute was 
designed to address and select the construction that best fits with that 
purpose,31 “new purposivism” theories alternately suggest that the 
Court has (1) shifted the focus of the purposive inquiry away from a 
statute’s underlying purpose to its implemental purpose, or (2) that it 
now uses statutory purpose to determine, as a threshold matter,
whether a statute is clear or ambiguous. Parts II and III will argue that 
the theoretical pictures of textualism and modern purposivism painted
by the existing literature are incorrect, or at least incomplete. But first, 
it is important to review the existing literature on textualism’s 
relationship to legislative intent and the “new purposivism.” 
A. The “Best Evidence” Theory 
As academic textualists have been at pains to explain, textualism 
has a more nuanced relationship to legislative purpose and intent than 
a surface-level understanding of textualism might suggest. In fact, some
textualists advocate that the statute’s text should be the focus of the 
interpretive analysis precisely because the text provides the best
30. See Manning, What Divides, supra note 25, at 87–88 & n.63 (identifying United States v. 
American Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534 (1940), as a prime example). In American Trucking
Ass’ns, the Court espoused the view that when a statute’s plain meaning produces a result that is
“plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole,” the Court “follow[s] that
purpose, rather than the literal words.” 310 U.S. at 543 (quoting Ozawa, 260 U.S. at 194). “When 
aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can
be no ‘rule of law’ which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on ‘superficial
examination.’” Id. at 543–44 (footnote omitted) (quoting Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United
States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928); Helvering v. N.Y. Tr. Co., 292 U.S. 455, 465 (1934)). 
31. See HART & SACKS, supra note 21, at 1374. 
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evidence of a statute’s purpose and intent.32 Further, as Professor Caleb 
Nelson explains, the fact that textualists criticize legislative history use
does not necessarily “prove” that textualists are uninterested in 
enforcing a statute’s intended meaning.33 Rather, such criticisms may 
simply reflect a view that judicial efforts to identify a statute’s intended 
meaning will be more successful if judges presume that members of
Congress use statutory words in their conventional sense, instead of
“combing the legislative history for signs that members of Congress 
agreed upon some other meaning.”34 In other words, textualists may
view legislative history as a misleading guide to legislative intent
without altogether shunning the endeavor to interpret statutes in light 
of that intent. Indeed, Nelson contends that textualists do care about 
legislative intent—but a different kind of legislative intent than 
intentionalists and purposivists care about. Specifically, he maintains 
that whereas intentionalists and purposivists tend to seek out the 
legislature’s intent regarding the motives or policy objectives 
underlying the enacted words, textualists view the legislative process 
as designed to achieve agreement on words—and therefore seek to 
identify the legislature’s intent regarding the meaning of the words it 
chose.35 
In a similar vein, Professor John Manning and Justice Scalia have 
argued that textualism, like purposivism, recognizes the need to
consider context when interpreting statutes.36 According to Manning,
however, the two interpretive approaches emphasize different forms of 
context.37 That is, textualism gives priority to semantic context— 
evidence about the way a reasonable person uses words; whereas 
purposivism gives priority to policy context—evidence about the way 
a reasonable person solves problems.38 Manning further contends that 
the textualist approach to context is justified because semantic detail is 
what enables legislators to set meaningful limits on a statute’s reach 
and to effectuate bargained-for compromises.39 He argues that
32. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 26, at 364.
 33. Id.
 34. Id.
 35. See id. at 370–71. 
36. Manning, What Divides, supra note 25, at 79–80 (“[O]ne can make sense of others’ 
communications only by placing them in their appropriate social and linguistic context . . . .”);
Scalia, supra note 16, at 37 (“In textual interpretation, context is everything . . . .”).
 37. Manning, What Divides, supra note 25, at 76.
 38. Id.
 39. Id. at 70, 92.
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purposivist judges, by finessing statutory meaning to make laws more
coherent with their apparent overall purposes, render it “surpassingly
difficult” for legislators to define reliable boundary lines for the 
compromises struck during the legislative process.40 
As noted above, textualist theory maintains that the best evidence
of a statute’s purpose and intent is the statute’s text itself—understood
in light of how a reasonable person uses words. The reasonable person 
standard marks another key difference between textualism and
purposivism: textualism focuses on the objective meaning that the text 
of the statute conveys to a reasonably informed reader;41 purposivism,
by contrast, focuses on the policy goals held by the legislators who
enacted the statute. Thus, while modern textualism acknowledges the 
importance of context and purpose to the interpretive endeavor, it also 
insists that such context and purpose be derived from the text of the 
statute. Justice Scalia once commented, for example, that “in a fair
reading, purpose—as a constituent of meaning—is to be derived
exclusively from a text.”42 Along the same lines, Manning heralds the
Supreme Court’s statement that “[t]here is . . . no more persuasive
evidence of the purpose of a statute than the words by which the 
legislature undertook to give expression to its wishes.”43 
In maintaining that text provides the best evidence of a statute’s 
purpose and intent, textualists are not, however, confining themselves 
to pure literalism or plain meaning analysis. Rather, they are willing to 
consider additional interpretive resources that can shed light on the
meaning that a reasonably informed reader would attribute to the
statute’s text—including linguistic rules or conventions about how 
language is used, dictionary definitions, common law conventions, and 
40. Id.
41. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 65 (1988) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Original Intent] (“We should look at 
the statutory structure and hear the words as they would sound in the mind of a skilled, objectively
reasonable user of words. . . . The meaning of statutes is to be found . . . in the understanding of
the objectively reasonable person.”); Scalia, supra note 16, at 17 (distinguishing between 
“subjective legislative intent” and what Justice Scalia calls “a sort of ‘objectified’ intent”).
 42. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 26, at 34. Scalia and Garner do take issue with the specific 
formulation that “the plain language of a statute is the ‘best evidence’ of legislative intent” on the
ground that the statute is the law, not merely evidence of the law. Id. at 397. But they also
subscribe to the general notion, common to textualists, that the statute’s text is the best guide to
its purpose and intent. Id. at 34. 
43. Manning, What Divides, supra note 25, at 87 (alteration and omission in original)
(quoting United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940)).
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the meaning given to similar statutory terms in other statutes.44 This is 
because in order to determine the way a reasonable user of language
would understand a statutory phrase or word, textualists must ascertain 
the unstated “assumptions shared by the speakers and the intended 
audience.”45 As Manning, Scalia, and Nelson have explained,
interpretive tools such as dictionary definitions, common law 
conventions, off-the-rack canons, and other similar contextual aids
shed light on the assumptions shared by the relevant legal community
and thereby help clarify the most likely meaning of the words that 
Congress enacted into law.46 
In short, textualist theorists have set up a nuanced dichotomy
between the textualist and purposivist approaches to legislative intent:
textualists seek to identify the objective meaning that a reasonably 
informed reader would attribute to a statute; purposivists, by contrast, 
seek to identify the statutory meaning that best effectuates Congress’s 
actual intent, purpose, or policy goals. Textualists regularly charge that 
purposivists, in relying on imprecise, manipulable resources such as 
legislative history and statutory purpose, leave themselves significant 
wiggle room to select statutory constructions that achieve policy goals 
that align with their own personal preferences.47 But as we shall see in 
Part III, it is equally possible that textualism’s “reasonably informed 
reader” approach and use of other supposedly neutral canons of 
statutory construction leave textualist judges similarly ample discretion 
to choose a statutory meaning that accords with their personal views
about the best or most “reasonable” policy.  
44. See, e.g., id. at 81–82 (listing contextual resources textualists “necessarily—and quite
properly” draw upon when interpreting statutes); Nelson, supra note 26, at 360–61 (stating that
textualists will consult other statutes with similar language as a source of context).
 45. Manning, What Divides, supra note 25, at 81 (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook, What Does 
Legislative History Tell Us?, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 441, 443 (1990) [hereinafter Easterbrook,
What Does Legislative History Tell Us?]).
 46. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 26, at 69–239 (discussing thirty-one “semantic” and 
“contextual” canons that help illuminate the semantic context of the statutory text); Manning,
What Divides, supra note 25, at 81–82, 94 & n.78; Nelson, supra note 26, at 389 (“To a large extent,
those canons can be seen as entrenched generalizations about the likely intent of the enacting
legislature.”).
 47. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 674 (1990)
[hereinafter Eskridge, Jr., New Textualism] (explaining that new textualists posit that legislative
history creates increased opportunities for judicial discretion); Scalia, supra note 16, at 35–36
(“[Legislative history] has facilitated rather than deterred decisions that are based upon the 
courts’ policy preferences . . . .”).
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B. The New Purposivism 
At the same time that modern textualist theorists have 
endeavored to clarify what kind of context (semantic) and intent 
(objective) textualism pay attention to, questions have abounded 
about the continued role of textualism’s rival philosophy— 
purposivism—in the modern, text-dominated era. Notably, two 
prominent textualist scholars have developed novel theories suggesting 
that purposivism has essentially reinvented itself in response to the
modern Court’s text-centric approach—by becoming text focused or
inserting itself into threshold inquiries about textual ambiguity. 
Academic textualist John Manning, for example, argues that the Court 
as a whole, including most of its purposivist Justices, has adopted a 
textually constrained form of purposivism that no longer privileges the 
“spirit” of a statute over its text but, rather, pays attention to 
Congress’s specific choices about the means by which the statute’s 
purposes are to be achieved.48 Manning distinguishes between what he 
calls a statute’s “ulterior” purpose—essentially the “spirit” or 
substantive goal of the statute—and its “implemental” purpose, which
refers to Congress’s choice of means for achieving the statute’s
substantive goals.49 He argues that the latter, implemental purpose is 
textually constrained because the Court takes its cues about Congress’s 
choice of means from the “level of generality at which Congress frames 
its statutory commands.”50 That is, the Court uses the text to delimit 
the outer contours of the statute’s purpose—to indicate just how far 
Congress has authorized the law to go in furthering the statute’s 
underlying objective.51 
48. See Manning, New Purposivism, supra note 4, at 115, 129 (“[A]ll but two of the Court’s
nontextualist Justices seem to have gone along with this change in approach . . . .”).
 49. Id. at 115.
 50. Id. at 132.
51. In an effort to make this claim more concrete, Manning points to Justice Kagan’s
majority opinion in Milner v. Department of the Navy, 562 U.S. 562 (2011), as an example. See 
Manning, New Purposivism, supra note 4, at 133. Milner involved Exemption 2 of the Freedom
of Information Act (“FOIA”), which excludes from FOIA’s compelled disclosure any agency 
records that are “related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency.” 562
U.S. at 565 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2)). At issue was whether Exemption 2 shields from
disclosure documents that contain Explosive Safety Quantity Distance (“ESQD”) information
used by the Navy to design storage facilities to house munitions at safe distances from each other.
Id. at 568. The Ninth Circuit had upheld the Navy’s use of Exemption 2 to withhold the ESQD
documents, reasoning that such documents relate to “predominantly internal” matters whose
“disclosure presents a risk of circumvention of agency regulation.” Milner v. U.S. Dep’t of the
Navy, 575 F.3d 959, 967–68 (9th Cir. 2009). The Ninth Circuit’s ruling was based on a traditional 
purposive analysis sourced from a D.C. Circuit opinion, which reasoned that while FOIA’s















   





   
 
 
   
  








    
 
    
     
 
 
2020] BACKDOOR PURPOSIVISM 1289 
In Manning’s view, it is only in those rare cases where the statute
is open-ended and invites judicial elaboration in common law 
fashion—that is, where the implemental purpose lacks limiting features 
and delegates discretion to the judiciary to determine how to achieve 
the statute’s substantive goals—that the modern Court seeks the 
statute’s ulterior purpose.52 In this sense, Manning’s focus on 
implemental purpose echoes Justice Scalia’s repeated exhortations 
that “[n]o legislation pursues its purposes at all costs”53 and that 
“[e]very statute proposes, not only to achieve certain ends, but also to 
achieve them by particular means.”54 
“primary purpose” was disclosure, Congress also had “a secondary purpose . . . of preserving the 
effective operation of governmental agencies” and that Congress could not have intended to
mandate disclosures that “undermined . . . the effectiveness of law enforcement agencies.”
Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 670 F.2d 1051, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (en
banc).
 In Milner, Justice Kagan’s majority opinion rejected this reasoning as inconsistent with 
the language of Exemption 2. Focusing on the key term “personnel,” the majority opinion found
that the exemption applied only to documents that “concern the conditions of employment in
federal agencies—such matters as hiring and firing, work rules and discipline, compensation and 
benefits.” Milner, 562 U.S. at 570. In so ruling, the majority claimed that its reading gave effect to
FOIA’s background goal of broad disclosure “through the simple device of confining the 
[exemption]’s meaning to its words,” id. at 572, and noted that “[i]n enacting FOIA, Congress
struck the balance it thought right—generally favoring disclosure, subject only to a handful of
specified exemptions,” id. at 571 n.5. Manning maintains that this example shows that Justice
Kagan “does not reject legislative purpose, but rather embraces it at a deeper level” by
recognizing that “in a system of legislative supremacy, Congress must have the capacity, through
the relative specificity or generality of its chosen language, to set meaningful boundaries on the
purposes it wishes courts and agencies to pursue.” Manning, New Purposivism, supra note 4, at
137. Manning contrasts the Milner Court’s approach with traditional purposivism, noting that 
unlike the classic purposivist approach exemplified by the Court’s holding in Holy Trinity, the 
Milner Court “declined to deviate” from the boundaries established by the text “in order to
pursue the goals that Congress apparently sought to achieve but that did not make their way into
the final text.” Id.
 52. Manning, New Purposivism, supra note 4, at 137–40 (discussing, for example, Justice 
Kagan’s opinion in Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826 (2011), which read open-ended language in a fee-
shifting statute “almost entirely in light of the Court’s perception of the statute’s ulterior
purposes”).
 53. See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 234 (2013) (Scalia, J.)
(quoting Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525–26 (1987) (per curiam)); Freeman v.
Quicken Loans, Inc., 566 U.S. 624, 637 (2012) (Scalia, J.) (same); see also MCI Telecomms. Corp. 
v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 231 n.4 (1994) (Scalia, J.) (“[Judges] . . . are bound, not only 
by the ultimate purposes Congress has selected, but by the means it has deemed appropriate, and 
prescribed, for the pursuit of those purposes.”).
54. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock
Co., 514 U.S. 122, 136 (1995) (Scalia, J.); see also SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 26, at 21
(reasoning that all statutes contain bargained-for limits and these limits are as much a part of the
statute as its purpose).
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Manning’s fellow textualist, Professor Richard Re, offers a 
decidedly different take on the status of modern purposivism, at least
on the Roberts Court. If Manning’s claim is essentially that Holy
Trinity55-style “spirit of the law” purposivism is dead,56 Re’s is that the 
Roberts Court has subtly revived Holy Trinity’s purposive approach— 
albeit in a modified form which he dubs “The New Holy Trinity.”57 
Specifically, Re argues that whereas the “Old Holy Trinity” asserted 
that even a concededly clear statutory text must give way to the
legislature’s purpose, the modern Court’s new purposivism takes 
legislative purpose and pragmatic considerations into account in
determining whether a statute’s text is clear or ambiguous in the first 
place.58 Once the Court concludes that a statute is ambiguous, however, 
it may again use legislative purpose and practical consequences, among 
other tools, to aid in its ultimate construction of the statute.59 In this
manner, purpose can play a crucial role in the statute’s interpretation
at two stages of the interpretive inquiry—but without openly trumping
statutory text in the way made infamous by the original Holy Trinity
decision.60 Indeed, Re suggests that modern purposivism has “evolved” 
in a manner that has enabled it to gain “the upper hand” over
textualism.61 
This Article suggests that the Roberts Court’s textualist and
textualist-leaning Justices are doing something quite different than 
what Manning and Re posit—something that could almost be
described as the mirror image of Manning’s “implemental purpose”
55. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892). In Holy Trinity, the
Supreme Court held that the importation of an Anglican minister from England did not violate
an 1885 immigration statute prohibiting contracts for transporting an alien into the United States
for “labor or service of any kind.” Id. at 458, 472. Although the text of the statute seemed to
clearly cover any labor or service, including those performed by a church minister, the Court 
famously declared that “a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the
statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers” and concluded that 
the statute did not prohibit the church’s action. Id. at 459. 
56. See Manning, New Purposivism, supra note 4, at 113 (“The Court . . . has not cited Holy
Trinity positively for more than two decades.”). 
57. Re, supra note 6, at 407–08. 
58. Id. at 417 (noting that when a text has multiple potential readings, “the [New Holy]
Trinitarian would consider purpose and pragmatism when deciding how high to set the bar for
textual clarity”).
 59. Id. (“And if the [New Holy] Trinitarian concluded that the relevant law is ambiguous,
then an additional purposive reason, or some other way of resolving the ambiguity, would have
to come into play.”).
 60. See Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 459.
 61. Re, supra note 6, at 407. 



















2020] BACKDOOR PURPOSIVISM 1291 
theory: rather than use statutory text to limit or define the outer
boundaries of a statute’s purpose, the textualist Justices are using other
interpretive tools—including language canons, the whole act rule, and
even pragmatic reasoning—to construct or simply assert, and 
sometimes even to expand, a statute’s purpose.62 That is, they are using
textual canons and practical consequences as launch pads for assuming 
or constructing legislative purpose and intent. And they are doing so
for statutes of all ilks, not just those that might be considered common 
law statutes designed to invite judicial elaboration. This backdoor 
purposivism goes beyond using textual cues to identify a statute’s 
objective intent or semantic context and crosses the line into
substantive judicial conjecture about Congress’s specific purpose and
intent—but it does so quietly and under the radar. This secretive
feature is troubling because it increases the risk that textualist Justices 
will—perhaps inadvertently—conflate their own intuitions and 
normative policy judgments with the legislature’s. This risk is examined 
further in Part III. For now, the Article simply notes that although the
textualist and textualist-leaning Justices speak about the textualist
canons as though they incontrovertibly dictate a particular statutory 
reading, close attention to the application of these canons shows that 
they leave significant room for judicial discretion and speculation. 
II. THE DATA
This Part presents data from my study of all statutory cases 
decided by the Roberts Court between January 31, 2006 and July 1,
2017. Section A describes the methodology used to code cases and 
Section B reports data from the study. As Section B explains, the data 
demonstrate that traditional purposivism is alive and well on the
Roberts Court—although it has been supplemented by close textual
analysis. In particular, the Court’s purposivist Justices—and even some
textualist-leaning Justices—continue to employ traditional purposive 
interpretive tools—including legislative history, congressional intent, 
and statutory purpose—regularly in the opinions they author, as well 
as seek to identify the statutory reading that best fulfills a statute’s 
broad overarching goals. Further, even some textualist-leaning Justices 
turn out to be frequent users of certain purposive interpretive tools. 
62. See infra Part II.B. 
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A. Methodology 
The findings and conclusions presented below are based on 
quantitative and qualitative analysis of all statutory interpretation
cases decided by the Roberts Court from January 31, 2006,63 through 
July 1, 2017. Every case decided during that period was examined 
through the Supreme Court’s online database to determine whether it 
dealt with a statutory issue. Any case that substantially discussed64 
statutory meaning was included in the study. Cases interpreting the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were not included,65 but a handful of 
constitutional cases in which the Court construed the meaning of a 
federal statute before deciding the constitutional question were
included.66 This selection methodology yielded 499 statutory cases over 
eleven and one-half terms. Of these, 255 cases were decided 
unanimously and 244 were decided by a divided vote.67 Collectively, 
these cases yielded 995 opinions: 499 majority or plurality opinions, 200 
concurring opinions, 266 dissenting opinions, 28 part-concurring or 
part-dissenting opinions, and two part-majority or part-concurring
opinions. 
Each of these cases was coded for certain criteria. The primary 
focus of the coding was to determine the frequency with which the
Court referenced different interpretive sources when construing 
federal statutes. Specifically, each opinion in each case was examined 
63. This is the date that Justice Alito joined the Court. Current Members, SUP. CT. U.S., 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx [https://perma.cc/CU8H-7S2Z]. “For ease
of reference, I refer to the half-term from January 31, 2006, through June 2006 as the “2005 Term.”
64. By “substantial discussion” I mean that the Court considered the meaning of the statute
an open question and engaged in some interpretive analysis to determine what the provision at
issue meant or covered.
65. I made this judgment call because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) are
drafted by judges rather than Congress and do not require the president’s approval. 28 U.S.C. §§
2072(a), 2074(a) (2018). Accordingly, several of the tools of statutory construction do not apply 
to the FRCP.  
66. In such cases, the opinion was coded as unanimous, close margin, or wide margin based
on the Justices’ votes regarding the statutory interpretation question only. Thus, if the Justices
agreed unanimously that the statute should be read to mean X, but split regarding the 
constitutional question, the opinion was still coded as unanimous. See, e.g., Nw. Austin Mun. Util.
Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 197, 212 (2009) (unanimously resolving the statutory 
question but splitting on the constitutional question—coded unanimous). 
67. This figure counts as unanimous all decisions in which there were no dissenting opinions,
even if concurring opinions offering different rationales were issued. By comparison, for the 2006– 
2016 Terms, there were 381 unanimously decided cases (including constitutional cases) and 451 
divided-vote cases. See Stat Pack Archive, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/ 
reference/stat-pack [https://perma.cc/948G-DNUW]. 
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for references to the following interpretive tools: (1) clarity of the text, 
including appeals to plain meaning; (2) dictionary definitions; (3) 
grammar rules; (4) the whole act rule; (5) other federal or state statutes;
(6) common law precedent; (7) substantive canons;68 (8) Supreme
Court precedent; (9) statutory purpose; (10) practical consequences; 
(11) legislative intent; (12) legislative history; (13) language canons 
such as expressio unius; and (14) references to some form of agency
deference.69 References to the whole act rule and language canons 
were coded separately as well as together, in one combined variable, in
order to allow comparisons with earlier studies in which some scholars 
coded all text-based canons together under one variable. When
reporting rates of usage, the Article will indicate whether it is 
referencing the combined figure for language/whole act canons or 
separate figures for each of these two forms of text-based interpretive 
tools. 
The interpretive resources coded for in this study are consistent
with those that have been examined in other empirical studies of the 
Court’s statutory interpretation practices.70 A few differences in
definitions for the different sources were inevitable and will be pointed 
out where notable. For example, some early empirical studies of the
Supreme Court’s statutory cases lumped language and substantive
canons together, rather than measure references to these different 
forms of canons separately, as this study did.71 Other studies coded 
practical consequences, agency-deference rules, common law 
practices, and/or substantive policy canons together, rather than treat 
these as separate interpretive resources, as was done in this study.72 
68. For a detailed list of the substantive canons found and coded, see Krishnakumar, 
Reconsidering Substantive Canons, supra note 12, app. at 901–09 (listing all of the substantive 
canons found in an earlier study of the Court’s 2005–2012 terms).
69. In order to reduce the risk of inconsistency, I and at least one research assistant 
separately read each opinion and separately recorded the use of each interpretive resource. In the 
event of disagreement, I reviewed the case and made the final coding determination. For a 
detailed explanation of my coding methodology, see Anita S. Krishnakumar, Statutory 
Interpretation in the Roberts Court’s First Era: An Empirical and Doctrinal Analysis, 62 HASTINGS 
L.J. 221, codebook at 291–96 (2010) [hereinafter Krishnakumar, First Era]. 
70. See, e.g., FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 143 (2009); Nina A. Mendelson, Change, Creation, and Unpredictability in
Statutory Interpretation: Interpretive Canon Use in the Roberts Court’s First Decade, 117 MICH. L.
REV. 71, 90–95 (2018); Schacter, Confounding Common Law, supra note 12, at 11–12; Zeppos,
supra note 12, at 1089. 
71. See, e.g., Schacter, supra note 12, Confounding Common Law, at 12. 
72. See, e.g., CROSS, supra note 70, at 144 (coding absurd-results arguments and Chevron
deference together as a form of pragmatic interpretation); Mendelson, supra note 70, at 100 













       
   
    





    
 
  
    
 
      
 
    
 
 
       
    
  
    
  
1294 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:1275 
In recording the Court’s reliance on particular interpretive tools, 
this study counted only references that reflected substantial judicial 
reliance on the tool in reaching an interpretation. Where an opinion 
mentioned an interpretive canon or tool, but rejected it as inapplicable, 
I did not count that as a reference to the canon or tool.73 Secondary or 
corroborative references to an interpretive tool, on the other hand,
were counted; thus, where the Court reached an interpretation based 
primarily on one interpretive source but went on to note that X, Y, and 
Z interpretive tools further supported that interpretation, the 
references to X, Y, and Z were coded along with the primary source.74 
In addition, the vote margin in each case was recorded, and each 
case and opinion was recorded as unanimous, close margin, or wide
margin (cases with six or more Justices in the majority). Each Justice’s
vote in each case also was recorded, as were the authors of each 
opinion. This methodology was the same as that followed in my
previous empirical studies.75 
(coding absurd results and common law references as substantive canons); Schacter, Confounding
Common Law, supra note 12, at 63 (listing in Appendix B coding parameters for “[j]udicially-
[s]elected [p]olicy [n]orms” that include both practical consequences arguments and substantive 
canons dealing with preemption and federalism).
73. A few examples may help illustrate. In Richlin Security Service Co. v. Chertoff, 553 U.S.
571 (2008), the Court considered whether the Equal Access to Justice Act entitles prevailing 
parties to recover paralegal fees from the government at market rates, or merely at the cost to the 
law firm of the paralegal’s time. Id. at 573. The Court concluded that the statute authorized
recovery at market rates, relying primarily on the statute’s text and a precedential case
interpreting an analogous statute. Id. at 577–81. The Court also discussed and rejected two
arguments raised by the government—one based on legislative history and another based on a
substantive canon. Id. at 583–85, 589. The opinion was coded for reliance on text, precedent, and 
other statutes; it was not coded for reliance on legislative history or substantive canons. Similarly,
in Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142 (2012), the Court held that the Fair
Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) does not require employers to pay overtime wages to
pharmaceutical-sales representatives. Id. at 147. In so ruling, the majority declined to defer to the
Department of Labor’s interpretation on the ground that the agency changed its long-standing
interpretation without “fair warning” to regulated parties. Id. at 154–59 (quoting Gates & Fox 
Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 790 F.2d 154, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). The
opinion was not coded for reliance on agency deference.
 74. For example, in Richlin, the Court noted at the end of its opinion that it “also
question[ed] the practical feasibility” of the rejected interpretation because calculating the cost
to the firm of the paralegal’s services would involve complex accounting considerations. 553 U.S.
at 587–88. Although this reference to practical consequences was made in passing, the opinion
was coded for reliance on practical consequences. Opinions referencing practical consequences
then were further disaggregated to record whether they placed “minimal,” “some,” or “heavy”
weight on practical considerations. See infra note 211 and accompanying text.
 75. See Anita S. Krishnakumar, Dueling Canons, 65 DUKE L.J. 909, 924 (2016) [hereinafter
Krishnakumar, Dueling Canons]; Krishnakumar, First Era, supra note 69, at 233; Krishnakumar,
Reconsidering Substantive Canons, supra note 12, at 844.
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Before reporting the data, it is important to note some limitations 
of this study. First, the study covers eleven and one-half Supreme Court 
terms and 499 statutory interpretation cases decided by some
combination of the same 12 Justices. While this dataset is large enough
to teach us some things about the Court’s use of various interpretive 
resources, the data reported may reflect trends specific to the Roberts 
Court. Second, great significance should not be placed on the precise 
percentages reported; the number of cases reviewed is large enough to 
provide some valuable insights, but the focus should be on the patterns 
that emerge rather than on specific percentages. Justice Gorsuch’s 
rates of reference should be viewed with particular caution, as the 
dataset contains only three opinions authored by him. Third, in noting 
the frequency with which the Court or its individual members invoked 
particular interpretive tools, I make no claims to have discovered the 
Justices’ underlying motivations for deciding a case; the data do not 
reveal whether a particular opinion referenced an interpretive canon
or tool because the author was persuaded by the canon or merely 
because the author thought the canon or tool was one that would
convince others. The study’s empirical and doctrinal claims are
confined to describing how the Justices publicly engage various 
interpretive canons and tools as justifications for their statutory
constructions and to theorizing about discernible patterns in their 
public engagement of such canons and tools. 
B. Purposivism Lives On
Table 1 reports the frequency with which the members of the 
Roberts Court as a whole referenced various interpretive canons and 
tools. For ease of comparison, the first column lists rates of reliance by 
textualist or textualist-leaning Justices, the second column reports the
Court’s overall rates of reliance, and the third column reports rates of
reliance for the Court’s purposivist Justices.76 For purposes of this 
Article, Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Gorsuch are labeled as 
“textualists,” while Justices Alito, Roberts, and Kennedy are identified 
as “textualist-leaning.”77 Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Gorsuch have 
self-identified as textualists and clearly follow or followed a textualist 
interpretive methodology—seeking to identify the plain meaning of
statutory text as informed by dictionary definitions, language canons,
76. See infra Table 1.
77. I have not included Justice Kavanaugh as he had not yet joined the Court during the 
period studied (2006–2017) and did not author any opinions in the dataset. 
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and the whole act rule and eschewing reliance on legislative history, 
intent, and purpose. Justices Alito, Roberts, and Kennedy, although 
less purist in their use of textualist interpretive tools, also emphasize
these tools when construing statutes.78 This labeling is consistent with
how other scholars and commentators have depicted these Justices.79 
Conversely, Justices Breyer, Stevens, Ginsburg, Souter, 
Sotomayor, and Kagan are treated as “purposivists.” Justices Breyer 
and Stevens have openly advocated for a purposivist approach to 
interpreting statutes80 and have regularly invoked statutory purpose, 
legislative history, and intent in the opinions they authored. Similarly,
although Justices Ginsburg, Kagan, Sotomayor, and Souter have not 
embraced the purposivist label so explicitly, they likewise regularly 
employed statutory purpose, legislative history, and intent in the 
opinions they authored. Again, this labeling of purposivist Justices is 
consistent with how other scholars and commentators have described 
these Justices.81 
78. See infra Table 2.
 79. See Ernest Gellhorn, Justice Breyer on Statutory Review and Interpretation, 8 ADMIN.
L.J. AM. U. 755, 758 (1995) (“Justices Kennedy and Scalia have led a ‘textualist’ movement
claiming that the ‘plain meaning’ of the statute should be given effect.”); Manning, Textualism
and the Equity of the Statute, supra note 17, at 125 (referring to Justice Kennedy as a textualist or,
at the least, as a “fellow traveler[]” of more acknowledged textualists); Peter J. Smith, Textualism
and Jurisdiction, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1883, 1887 (2008) (“[I]t appears that several Justices— 
clearly Justices Scalia and Thomas, and perhaps Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and
Kennedy—on the Supreme Court now consider themselves textualists.”); Charlie D. Stewart, The 
Rhetorical Canons of Construction: New Textualism’s Rhetoric Problem, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1485, 
1486 (2018) (noting that Justice Gorsuch is a textualist); John F. Duffy, In re Nuijten: Patentable
Subject Matter, Textualism and the Supreme Court, PATENTLY-O (Feb. 5, 2007),
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2007/02/in_re_nuijten_p.html [https://perma.cc/J9MH-473Z]
(describing Justices Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito as “adher[ing] to some form of
fairly rigorous textualism in statutory interpretation”); see also Neil M. Gorsuch, Of Lions and
Bears, Judges and Legislators, and the Legacy of Justice Scalia, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 909
(2016) (“[A]n assiduous focus on text, structure, and history is essential to the proper exercise of
the judicial function.”).
 80. See W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 115 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(noting that statutes are likely to be imprecise and that “we do the country a disservice when we
needlessly ignore persuasive evidence of Congress’ actual purpose and require it ‘to take the time
to revisit the matter’ and to restate its purpose in more precise English whenever its work product 
suffers from an omission or inadvertent error” (footnote omitted) (quoting Smith v. Robinson,
468 U.S. 992, 1031 (1984) (Brennan, J. dissenting))); STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY:
INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 99 (2005) (describing Justice Breyer’s
approach toward statutory construction: a purpose-based method that uses “whatever tools best
identify congressional purpose in the circumstances”). 
81. See, e.g., Brudney & Baum, supra note 2, at 490 (calling Justices Breyer, Stevens and 
Souter purposivists); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism and Normative Canons, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 531, 551 (2013) [hereinafter Eskridge, Jr., Normative Canons] (book review)
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Table 1 
Roberts Court Overall Rates of Reliance on Individual Interpretive Tools 


























































































(same for Justices Breyer and Ginsburg); Asher Hawkins, The Least “Constructive” Provisions?:
Analyzing the Bankruptcy Code’s Codified Canons, 59 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 625, 638 (2014) (same
for Justices Stevens, Breyer, and Kagan); Manning, New Purposivism, supra note 4, at 128 (calling 
Justices Stevens and Breyer “the Court’s strongest purposivists”).
82. This column contains 30 per curiam opinions that are not included in the counts of
textualist- and nontextualist-authored opinions in the other two columns, as the authors of these 
30 opinions are unknown.
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17.8% 24.9% 34.4%Purpose (n=93) (n=248) (n=152) 
6.1% 11.9% 19.5%Intent (n=32) (n=118) (n=86)
12.6% 22.7% 36.0%Legis. Hist. (n=66) (n=226) (n=159) 
As the Table reveals, the Justices’ overall rates of reference to 
individual interpretive tools are remarkably consistent, irrespective of
their interpretive philosophies. Notably, the interpretive tools most 
frequently invoked by the Court as a whole—Supreme Court 
precedent, text or plain meaning, and practical consequences—were
the same as those most frequently invoked by the textualist-leaning 
and purposivist Justices as subgroups. The combined whole act rule
and language canons, other statutes, and dictionary definitions also
featured regularly in the opinions authored by the Court as a whole
and by the textualist and purposivist Justices as subgroups—appearing 
in roughly 20 to 25 percent of the opinions studied. However, the
Court’s purposivist Justices also frequently invoked statutory purpose
and legislative history, and, to a lesser extent, legislative intent; the 
Court’s textualist and textualist-leaning Justices, by contrast, employed 
these interpretive tools at far lower rates.83 The other interpretive tools 
were invoked at lower rates across the board, typically in less than 15
percent of the opinions studied.
Table 2 reports individual Justices’ rates of reliance on particular 
interpretive tools in the 965 opinions decided during the 2005–2016 
terms whose authorship is known.84 Again, the data reveal that 
Supreme Court precedent, text or plain meaning, and practical 
reasoning were employed at high rates across the board: most Justices 
invoked precedent and plain meaning over 40 percent of the time and
83. The purposivist Justices as a group referenced legislative history in 36 percent of the
opinions they authored, as compared to 12.6 percent for the textualist Justices as a group;
purposivists likewise referenced statutory purpose in 34.4 percent of the opinions they authored,
compared to 17.8 percent for the textualists; finally, purposivists referenced legislative intent in
19.5 percent of the opinions they authored, compared to 6.1 percent for the textualists. See supra
Table 1. 
84. This excludes 30 per curiam opinions decided during the period studied because the 
opinions’ authors are unknown.



























      
   
2020] BACKDOOR PURPOSIVISM 1299 
practical consequences in more than 30 percent of opinions.85 The 
whole act rule and language canons also were invoked frequently by all 
of the Justices, while dictionary definitions and other statutes were
invoked regularly by some Justices and infrequently by others, and the 
common law was referenced at relatively low rates across the board.86 
The Justices diverged, however, in their use of purposive and 
intentionalist tools. Notably, the purposivist Justices invoked the
legislative record, statutory purpose, and legislative intent at markedly
higher rates than their textualist and textualist-leaning counterparts: 
most of the purposivist Justices openly invoked legislative purpose in
over one-third of the opinions they authored;87 among the textualist-
leaning Justices, only Justice Kennedy invoked purpose at a high rate 
(45.1 percent). Similarly, the purposivist Justices openly referenced 
legislative intent at noticeably higher rates88 than did the textualist and
textualist-leaning Justices. 
Thus, contrary to some recent commentary about the Court’s 
trajectory,89 the purposivist Justices on the Roberts Court do not 
appear to have retreated from traditional purposive analysis or reliance 
on traditional purposivist tools such as legislative history. However, 
they do appear to have embraced several textualist interpretive tools, 
such as language canons and the whole act rule, other statutes, and 
dictionary definitions. 
85. Most of the Justices relied on plain meaning in 40.8 to 66.7 percent of the opinions they
authored. Justices Breyer and Ginsburg were the only outliers, and even they invoked the
statute’s plain meaning in 25.4 and 27.7 percent of the opinions they authored, respectively. The
Justices also referenced Supreme Court precedent in 48 to 66.2 percent of the opinions they
authored (excepting Justice Gorsuch, who authored only three opinions in the dataset). Finally,
the Justices’ rates of reference to practical consequences ranged from 28.3 to 50.7 percent
(excepting Justice Thomas, who referenced such consequences in only 16.8 percent of his
opinions).
86. Most of the Justices invoked the common law in less than 15 percent of the opinions they
authored.
87. Justice Souter was the exception, referencing purpose in 17.1 percent of the opinions he
authored. Justices Breyer and Kagan openly referenced purpose in 40.7 and 43.8 percent of the 
opinions they authored, respectively.
88. The exception was Justice Kagan, who referenced legislative intent in only 4.2 percent of
the 48 opinions she authored.
 89. See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2
(2006) (commenting that textualists have been “successful [in] discrediting strong purposivism” 
and that there is little “remaining territory between textualism’s adherents and nonadherents”).
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Table 2 
Individual Justices’ Rates of Reliance on All Interpretative Tools 
by Opinion Author90 (n=965)91 
Canons/ Scalia Thomas Alito Roberts Kennedy Souter
Interpretive 
Tools (n=127) (n=143) (n=108) (n=71) (n=71) (n=35)
Text / Plain 
Meaning
52.8% 50.3% 42.6% 40.8% 45.1% 45.7%
Sup. Court 
Precedent 
48.0% 53.8% 52.8% 64.8% 66.2% 54.3%
Dictionary
Definitions
20.4% 23.8% 24.1% 16.9% 23.9% 17.1%
Lang. Canons / 
Whole Act 29.9% 33.6% 29.6% 39.4% 35.2% 31.4%
Rule 
Other Statutes 19.7% 16.1% 26.9% 26.8% 21.1% 22.9%
Common Law 11.8% 11.2% 18.5% 16.9% 5.6% 14.3%
Substantive 13.4% 15.4% 12.0% 21.1% 18.3% 14.3%
Canons
Practical 28.3% 16.8% 38.9% 33.8% 50.7% 31.4%
Consequences* 
Purpose* 10.2% 11.2% 21.3% 12.7% 45.1% 17.1%
Intent* 3.9% 2.1% 13.0% 7.0% 22.9% 14.9%
Legis. Hist.* 6.3% 6.3% 17.6% 14.1% 28.2% 28.6%
90. Percentages reported in each row represent the number of opinions authored by each
Justice that invoked the listed interpretive canon, divided by the total number of statutory
interpretation opinions each Justice authored (that total number is reported below each Justice’s 
name as n= X).
91. The total number of opinions reflected in the Table is 965, rather than 995 because the
Table omits 30 per curiam opinions issued during the period studied. 










   
  
 
   
 
 





   
 
 




   
 
 








   
 
 
    
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
2020] BACKDOOR PURPOSIVISM 1301 
Canons/ Ginsburg Breyer Stevens Sotomayor Kagan Gorsuch
Interpretive 
Tools (n=101) (n=118) (n=61) (n=79) (n=48) (n=3)
Text / Plain 
Meaning
27.7% 25.4% 42.6% 44.3% 47.9% 66.7%
Sup. Court 
Precedent 
53.5% 55.9% 54.1% 64.6% 54.2% 0.0%
Dictionary
Definitions
10.9% 14.4% 16.4% 31.6% 39.6% 33.3%
Lang. Canons / 
Whole Act 23.8% 21.2% 24.6% 46.8% 31.3% 33.3%
Rule 
Other Statutes 21.8% 16.9% 16.4%  25.3% 16.7% 0.0%
Common Law 6.9% 14.4% 16.4% 16.5% 8.3% 0.0%
Substantive 17.8% 9.3% 24.6% 13.9% 20.8%
Canons 0.0%
Practical 
38.6% 44.9% 29.5% 41.8% 35.4% 33.3%Consequences* 
Purpose* 33.7% 40.7% 29.5% 31.6% 43.8% 0.0%
Intent* 16.9% 41.0% 40.0% 20.3% 4.2% 0.0%
Legis. Hist.* 31.7% 42.4% 37.7% 38.0% 29.2% 0.0%
* Indicates that a one-way ANOVA test, using a Bonferroni multiple-comparison test, reveals a 
significant difference between rates of reliance by different Justices in the opinions they authored
at p < .05. (For Text or Plain Meaning p=.000; Practical Consequences p=.0091; Purpose p=.000; 
Intent p=.000; and Legislative History p=.0001). In other words, for these particular interpretive
tools, the patterns or differences in rates of reference across Justices were less than 5 percent
likely to have occurred merely by chance.
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Moreover, some textualist-leaning Justices openly referenced 
purposive interpretive tools on a regular basis in the opinions they 
authored: Justices Kennedy and Alito referenced legislative history in 
28.2 percent and 17.6 percent of the opinions they authored, 
respectively, and statutory purpose in 45.1 percent and 21.3 percent of 
the opinions. In addition, Justice Kennedy referenced legislative intent 
in 22.9 percent of the opinions he authored.92 As discussed further in
Part IV.C, these data suggest that there may be a textualist–purposivist 
continuum on the modern Court, rather than a strict textualist– 
purposivist divide.
Finally, Table 3a reports the frequency with which the members 
of the Roberts Court openly referenced statutory purpose and intent 
in conjunction with other interpretive tools. The data reveal that in
those cases in which the members of the Roberts Court invoked the 
statute’s purpose or intent, they also often referenced precedent,
practical consequences, and the ordinary or plain meaning of the 
statute’s text. In addition, references to purpose and intent were 
regularly—and predictably—accompanied by citations to the 
legislative history. Interestingly, purpose and intent also were linked to 
use of the whole act rule—a traditional textualist tool. This 
demonstrates a tendency to supplement purposive analysis with text-
focused arguments. In short, the data suggest that the Court’s 
purposivist Justices—who were responsible for the majority of open 
references to purpose and intent—were pluralistic in their use of
interpretive resources, often weaving their purpose- and intent-based 
analysis together with more text-based tools. 
92. See supra Table 2.
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Table 3a
Use of Other Interpretative Tools in Opinions that Openly 
Referenced Purpose and Intent
Interpretative Tool
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In one sense, this may all seem rather unextraordinary. Aside from 
textualist Justices’ high rate of references to practical consequences 
and purposivist Justices’ continued use of purposive interpretive tools 
in the face of the Court’s pronounced move toward text-based analysis, 
we might well have predicted that textualist-leaning Justices would
reference text, precedent, the whole act rule, language, and grammar 
canons frequently. Indeed, we might even applaud them for sticking to 
their theoretical guns and refraining, for the most part, from relying 
frequently on legislative history, purpose, or intent. But if we look
closely at the textualist Justices’ opinions in these cases, we find some
surprising trends at work. Notably, we see purpose and intent creeping
in through the back door. For although the textualist Justices’ opinions
did not directly or expressly rely on purpose or intent, their use of
practical consequences, the whole act rule, and language canons
contained notable speculation about, and even construction of, 
legislative purpose and intent. The next Part examines this 
phenomenon in greater detail, suggesting that this practice goes 
beyond the mere use of text as the “best evidence” of intent and 
purpose or identifying the meaning that a reasonable reader would 
attribute to a statute.
III. TEXTUALISTS’ PURPOSE BY OTHER MEANS
Once we move beyond surface statistics and examine closely the 
Court’s references to practical consequences, the whole act rule, and
language canons such as noscitur a sociis, we find that there is more 
than a little hidden purpose and legislative intent at work. This is true
of opinions authored by textualist, textualist-leaning, and purposivist 
Justices, although the purposivist Justices also frequently invoked
purpose and intent outright in the opinions they authored. The 
textualist and textualist-leaning Justices, by contrast, tended not to 
expressly invoke purpose or intent but, rather, engaged in oblique 
purposive analysis and deductions through other interpretive tools. In
so doing, the textualist and textualist-leaning Justices used traditional 
textualist tools, and even pragmatic reasoning, not merely to identify
how “‘a skilled, objectively-reasonable user of words’ would have 
understood the statutory text in context,”93 but to insist that X reading 
93. Manning, What Divides, supra note 25, at 75 (quoting Easterbrook, Original Intent, supra
note 41, at 65). 
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could not be correct because it contravenes Congress’s actual purpose
or intent. That is, they regularly went beyond using textual canons and 
tools to decipher what an ordinary reasonable person would 
understand the language of the statute to mean and traversed into 
guessing or asserting that Congress had X specific intent or Y specific 
purpose in mind when it enacted the statute.
A. Noscitur a Sociis and Ejusdem Generis
Perhaps the most interesting doctrinal discovery is that the 
textualist and textualist-leaning Justices on the Roberts Court 
regularly used two tried-and-true textualist canons, noscitur a sociis
and ejusdem generis, to infer an underlying statutory purpose. Noscitur 
a sociis directs that when a word or phrase in a list is unclear, its 
meaning “should be determined by the words immediately 
surrounding it.”94 Ejusdem generis similarly dictates that “when a
general word or phrase follows a list of specifics, the general word or 
phrase will be interpreted to include only items of the same class as 
those listed.”95 This Article’s finding that the Court’s textualist and 
textualist-leaning Justices use these canons to infer statutory purpose 
is significant because the linguistic canons are widely heralded as “rule-
like,” “predictable,” and “objective” interpretive tools that point 
clearly to one correct statutory meaning and “constrain” judicial 
discretion96—not as open-ended interpretive guides that invite judicial 
speculation into amorphous concepts such as legislative purpose or 
94. Noscitur a sociis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Noscitur a sociis translates
as “it is known by its associates.” Id.
 95. Ejusdem generis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Ejusdem generis translates
as “of the same kind or class.” Id. While my coding did not separately measure the Court’s
reliance on these two Latin canons, the overall reference rate for all language and grammar
canons combined was 8.3 percent.
 96. See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 26, at xxviii–xxix (claiming that the canons “will
curb—even reverse—the tendency of judges to imbue authoritative texts with their own policy
preferences” and provide “certainty” and “predictability” in statutory interpretation);
LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES 38 (1993) (considering judicial treatment of
syntax canons as “hard and fast rule[s] of law”); Gorsuch, supra note 79, at 917 (“[Canons] confine
the range of possible outcomes and provide a remarkably stable and predictable set of
rules . . . .”); Bradford C. Mank, Is a Textualist Approach to Statutory Interpretation Pro-
Environmentalist?: Why Pragmatic Agency Decisionmaking Is Better than Judicial Literalism, 53
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1231, 1238–39 (1996) (“Justice Scalia and other new textualists . . . use 
canons of construction . . . to provide a fixed, ‘objective’ meaning.”); Mendelson, supra note 70,
at 76, 87 (noting that many defenders of textual canons argue that “canons are rule-like” and
“represent clear interpretive rules that can coordinate and constrain judicial decisionmaking and
render interpretation more predictable”).
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intent.97 This Section examines some illustrative cases and notes that
the noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis canons by their nature confer 
significant discretion on judges and virtually require judicial 
identification of a statutory purpose—so it should come as little 
surprise that the Court’s textualists have been using them to construct 
or assert a statutory purpose in a number of cases. 
Consider the following examples: 
Dolan v. United States Postal Service98 involved the Federal Tort 
Claims Act (“FTCA”), which generally waives the United States’ 
sovereign immunity for negligent acts committed by federal 
government employees.99 The FTCA contains thirteen exceptions, 
including an exception for “[a]ny claim arising out of the loss, 
miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter.”100 
Dolan raised the question whether a private citizen who was injured 
when she tripped over a package negligently left on her porch by a 
postal service employee could sue the United States—or whether such
a lawsuit was barred because it arose out of the “negligent 
transmission” of postal matter.101 In an opinion authored by Justice
Kennedy, the Court ruled that the “negligent transmission” exception 
did not bar the lawsuit.102 In so ruling, it emphasized that “the words
‘negligent transmission’ . . . follow two other terms, ‘loss’ and
‘miscarriage,’” and insisted that those terms “limit the reach” of the
third term, “transmission.”103 The Court then invoked the noscitur a
sociis canon—although without naming it explicitly—explaining that 
“[a] word is known by the company it keeps”104 and that “[w]ords 
97. Scalia and Garner have acknowledged the potential “indeterminacy” of the ejusdem 
generis canon, but not the inherently purposive nature of the act of identifying a common thread
connecting list terms. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 26, at 207. However, they caution against 
“exaggerat[ing]” the difficulty of identifying the correct connecting thread and endorse the canon 
nonetheless. Id. at 208. Justice Kavanaugh similarly has noted that the ejusdem generis canon is
indeterminate, but not that it invites judicial construction of a statutory purpose. Brett M.
Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2160–61 (2016) (book 
review). Unlike Scalia and Garner, he recommends abandoning the canon because it confers too
much discretion on judges. See id. Neither Scalia and Garner nor Kavanaugh has noted the
indeterminacy of the noscitur a sociis canon.
98. Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481 (2006). 
99. Id. at 484.
 100. Id. at 485 (alteration in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b)).
 101. Id.
 102. Id. at 483.
 103. Id. at 486.
 104. Id. (quoting Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961)).
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grouped in a list should be given related meaning.”105 Reasoning that 
“mail is ‘lost’ if it is destroyed or misplaced and ‘miscarried’ if it goes 
to the wrong address,” the Court concluded that these terms “refer to 
failings in the postal obligation to deliver mail in a timely manner to 
the right address.”106 Because “negligent transmission” follows these
two words, “it would be odd” if that term “swept far more broadly” to 
bar recovery for injuries that are “caused by postal employees but 
involve neither failure to transmit mail nor damage to its contents.”107 
This is a classic application of the noscitur a sociis canon—and one 
that quietly divines Congress’s organizing purpose and intent. By 
defining the common thread that connects the terms “loss” and
“miscarriage” narrowly to encompass “failings in the postal obligation 
to deliver mail in a timely manner to the right address”108—rather than 
broadly to cover, say, “mistakes made by postal service employees”— 
the Court effectively decided that Congress’s specific intent was to 
retain sovereign immunity for the government against damages 
resulting from a citizen’s failure to receive mail, but not against all 
damages caused by postal service employees. This conclusion was not 
inevitable. Indeed, the Third Circuit had unanimously found just the 
opposite, citing the statute’s “expansive language” as evidence of 
“Congress’s intent to broaden rather than limit” the reach of the
statutory exception.109 Justice Thomas’s dissent similarly argued that 
reading the listed statutory terms to cover only claims arising from 
“failings in the postal obligation to deliver mail” was an unnecessarily 
narrow move that would lead to confusing and arbitrary line drawing.110 
Instead, he, like the Third Circuit, would have defined the common 
denominator connecting those terms more broadly—and thereby 
expanded the statute’s intended reach—to cover any tort committed 
by a postal service employee.111 




109. Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 377 F.3d 285, 288 (3d Cir. 2004).
 110. Dolan, 546 U.S. at 495–97 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
111. Id. at 494. There are several other similar examples of cases in which the Court’s
textualist-leaning Justices used the noscitur a sociis canon to impute purpose or intent to
Congress. See Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434, 448 (2014) (“The first five categories
provide guidance to district courts as to the specific types of losses Congress thought would often 
be the proximate result of a Chapter 110 offense . . . .” (emphasis added)); Maracich v. Spears, 
570 U.S. 48, 62–64 (2013) (holding that the common thread connecting the terms “service of 
process, investigation in anticipation of litigation, and the execution or enforcement of judgments
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The textualist-leaning Justices similarly have employed the 
ejusdem generis canon in a manner that imputes a specific purpose or
intent to Congress. In James v. United States,112 for example, the Court 
considered the residual clause of a sentencing-enhancement provision
of the Armed Career Criminals Act (“ACCA”), which imposed a 
mandatory sentence of fifteen years for a defendant convicted of 
possessing a firearm “if the defendant ha[d] three prior convictions ‘for 
a violent felony or a serious drug offense.’”113 At the time, the ACCA
defined a “violent felony” as “any crime punishable by imprisonment 
for a term exceeding one year . . . that . . . is burglary, arson, or 
extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct 
that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”114 
The statutory question was whether attempted burglary qualified as
“conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to 
another.”115 The defendant argued that it did not, invoking the ejusdem 
generis canon and arguing that the “common attribute” of the offenses 
specifically enumerated in the statute was that all were “completed
offenses.”116 The Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Alito,
rejected that reading, finding instead that the “most relevant common 
attribute” of the enumerated offenses was that all “create significant 
risks of bodily injury or confrontation that might result in bodily 
injury.”117 Justice Scalia dissented, offering a third ejusdem generis
common denominator—that the “otherwise” clause should be read to
encompass “conduct that resembles, insofar as the degree of such risk
is concerned, the previously enumerated crimes.”118 
As in Dolan, the act of identifying a common theme connecting 
the listed items required a fair amount of guesswork about Congress’s 
underlying purpose in enacting the statute. And such guesswork, as 
and orders” in 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(4) is that they involve attorney’s conduct when acting as an
officer of the court conducting litigation, not as a commercial actor soliciting client business);
Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cty., 555 U.S. 271, 282 (2009) (Alito, J.,
concurring) (“It is noteworthy that all of the other conduct protected by this provision—making
a charge, testifying, or assisting or participating in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing— 
requires active and purposive conduct.”).
112. James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007), overruled by Johnson v. United States, 135 
S. Ct. 2551 (2015).
 113. Id. at 195 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2000 & Supp. IV)). 
114. Id. at 196 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)). 
115. Id. at 197.
 116. Id. at 199 (emphasis added).
 117. Id.
 118. Id. at 218 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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elaborated in Part IV, almost inevitably empowers judges to identify a
purpose or intent that is consistent with their own views about what is
reasonable or sensible. Indeed, each of the three “common attributes” 
identified in James reflected a different judgment about the sentencing 
enhancement’s intended goal: the defendant’s reading suggested a 
purpose or intent to cover only completed crimes but not attempted 
ones; the majority’s construction speculated that punishing 
confrontations that could lead to bodily injury was the statute’s 
objective; and Justice Scalia’s interpretation assumed a statutory intent
to sweep in only those crimes that posed an equal or greater degree of 
risk than the enumerated crimes. None of these presumed goals or 
common attributes were obviously or inevitably correct. Indeed, the 
connecting themes selected by the majority and by Justice Scalia added 
significantly to the text of the statute—which does not contain the 
terms “confrontation” or “resembles” or “least dangerous.” Thus, far 
from pointing neatly and precisely to the one correct meaning that a 
reasonable reader would attribute to the statute, the ejusdem generis
canon afforded the Justices in James significant discretion and 
interpretive license to define the statute’s scope and purpose as they 
saw fit.119 
Purposivist Justices also impute purpose and intent to Congress 
when they employ the noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis canons, but 
when they do so, the work that statutory purpose performs tends not
to be so hidden or oblique. This is because the purposivist Justices
often openly invoke statutory purpose or legislative intent alongside
their noscitur and ejusdem arguments, so that these language canons fit 
into a broader overall discussion about purpose and intent—rather 
than using such canons indirectly, and perhaps even unintentionally, to 
119. Additional cases illustrate the inherent discretion and purposive analysis entailed in
applying the ejusdem generis canon. See, e.g., Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S.
142, 163 (2012) (declining to apply the ejusdem generis canon to an FLSA overtime exception
because it “would defeat Congress’ intent to define ‘sale’ in a broad manner” and would render
the “other disposition” clause “meaningless”); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 
109, 114–15 (2001) (holding that ejusdem generis suggests that an FAA exemption excluding
“contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged
in foreign or interstate commerce” applies only to transportation workers). Conflicting 
interpretations of the same statute also help to illuminate the discretion involved in applying the
canon. Compare Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 230, 232 (2008) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting) (concluding that the common thread connecting terms in the 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c)
phrase “any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer” is officers involved
in enforcing revenue laws or conducting border searches), with id. at 225–26 (majority opinion)
(Thomas, J.) (stating that another plausible “common attribute” could be officers involved in “the
assessment and collection of taxes and customs duties and the detention of property”).
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construe a statutory theme on their own. In other words, when the 
purposivist Justices identify a common denominator connecting the 
words in a statutory list, they often do so in light of a legislative purpose 
or intent that they have already identified through other interpretive 
resources, whereas the textualist and textualist-leaning Justices are 
more likely to rely on the language canons alone.120 
The plurality and concurring opinions in Yates v. United States121 
provide a good example of this difference between purposivist and
textualist Justices’ use of the noscitur and ejusdem canons to identify a 
statute’s purpose. Yates involved a criminal evidence-tampering statute 
that punishes one who “knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals,
covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or 
tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence [an] 
investigation.”122 The statute was enacted as part of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act in the wake of the Enron financial scandal.123 Yates was a 
commercial fisherman who caught undersized red grouper and
instructed his crew to throw the fish overboard after being cited and
told by a federal agent to retain the fish.124 The statutory question was 
whether a “fish” is a “tangible object” within the meaning of the 
evidence-tampering statute.125 Justice Ginsburg’s plurality opinion
concluded that a “fish” is not the kind of “tangible object” the statute 
was designed to reach.126 The plurality opinion invoked numerous tools 
of statutory construction, including dictionary definitions, several 
whole-act-rule arguments, the rule of lenity, legislative history, the 
purpose of the statute, and the noscitur a sociis canon. Significantly, the 
opinion opened by noting that the evidence-tampering statute was 
enacted as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in response to the Enron 
scandal.127 It observed that prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, there was 
a “conspicuous omission” in the law regarding document destruction 
and that Congress enacted the provision at issue to cure that 
120. When textualist and textualist-leaning Justices do supplement their language-canon
analysis, they tend to do so with precedent or practical-consequences arguments rather than
purposivist-favored interpretive tools such as legislative history.
121. Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528 (2015).
 122. Id. at 531 (plurality opinion) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1519). 
123. Id. at 532.
 124. Id. at 532–34. 
125. Id. at 534.
 126. Id. at 532.
 127. Id.






















      
  
   
    
   
     
   
 
   
2020] BACKDOOR PURPOSIVISM 1311 
omission.128 The opinion reasoned that “it would cut [the statute] loose 
from its financial-fraud mooring to hold that it encompasses any and
all objects, whatever their size or significance, destroyed with 
obstructive intent.”129 Instead, the plurality concluded that, because
“Congress trained its attention on corporate and accounting deception
and cover-ups,” the Court should adopt “a matching construction” of 
the statute.130 Having thus established that the statute’s purpose was 
limited to preventing document destruction in the course of financial
fraud, the opinion then turned to several textual canons, including
noscitur a sociis. 
Specifically, the opinion noted that “tangible object” was the last 
in a list of terms that began with “any record [or] document.”131 
Accordingly, the plurality insisted, the term is “appropriately read to
refer, not to any tangible object, but specifically to the subset of 
tangible objects involving records and documents, i.e., objects used to
record or preserve information.”132 As in Dolan and James, the act of 
identifying a common denominator connecting the terms in the 
statutory list was inescapably purposive, in that it required the Court 
to decide what Congress’s goal was in enacting the statute. The
difference is that in Yates, unlike in Dolan and James, the plurality had
already identified Congress’s goal earlier in the opinion, when it
discussed the statute’s financial-fraud-related roots and its focus on
preventing document destruction. The act of finding a common 
denominator connecting the list terms was thus part and parcel of a
larger, open, and express project of discerning the statute’s purpose 
and design.133 
128. Id. at 536.
 129. Id. at 532.
 130. Id. 
131. Id. at 544 (alteration in original).
 132. Id. (emphasis added). 
133. The case law is full of examples of purposivist Justices employing noscitur a sociis or
ejusdem generis to derive statutory purpose. See, e.g., Life Tech. Corp. v. Promega Corp., 137 S.
Ct. 734, 740 (2017) (concluding that in 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) the term “substantial” should be
interpreted in light of its neighboring terms “all” and “portion,” both of which convey a 
quantitative meaning); Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 569 U.S. 267, 274–75 (2013) (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (looking to the neighboring terms “embezzlement” and “larceny” to provide 
context for “defalcation”); Graham Cty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel.
Wilson, 559 U.S. 280, 303–04 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (interpreting 31 U.S.C.
§ 3730(e)(4)(A) and concluding that “Congress’ choice of two ‘clearly federal terms [to] bookend
the not-so-clearly federal term’ [is] a ‘very strong contextual cue’” that the third term is also meant 
to apply only to federal agencies (first alteration in original) (quoting United States ex rel. Wilson
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Justice Alito’s concurring opinion, by contrast, employed the
noscitur a sociis canon in a far less openly purposive manner—but one 
that contained inferences about statutory purpose all the same. Justice
Alito’s short opinion focused exclusively on the statute’s text, and
began with the noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis canons, treating 
them together.134 The opinion briefly explained what each canon means 
and then straightforwardly asserted that, “[a]pplying these canons to 
§ 1519’s list of nouns, the term ‘tangible object’ should refer to 
something similar to records or documents.”135 Although Justice Alito
did not explain what features records and documents have in common, 
he turned to the statute’s list of verbs—“alters, destroys, mutilates, 
conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in”—and identified 
a common thread of “filekeeping.”136 Next, he concluded that the 
phrase “makes a false entry in” must be limited in scope to items that
can be filed because it “makes no sense outside of filekeeping.” He 
then reasoned that the term “alters” and especially the term “falsifies” 
are also “closely associated with filekeeping.”137 Justice Alito’s noscitur
and ejusdem analysis ended there, with no specific discussion about
Congress’s purpose or the Enron-related origins of the statute. Yet 
despite the brevity of his analysis, it is difficult to view Justice Alito’s 
conclusion that the list items share a common thread of “filekeeping”
as nonpurposive, purely textual analysis. The “filekeeping” common
denominator indisputably limits the statute’s scope to written items 
that can be put in a file or in which a “false entry” can be made and
imputes to Congress an intent to cover only such written, falsifiable
items. It is difficult to imagine Justice Alito identifying “filekeeping”
as the common thread connecting the verbs listed in the statute absent 
a background understanding that the statute was designed to prevent
document destruction in the wake of the Enron scandal. In other 
words, although not explicitly mentioned, Enron and the statute’s 
financial-fraud-defeating purpose seem to be lurking in the shadows of 
Justice Alito’s conclusion that “alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals,
covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in” must refer to filekeeping.
Thus, purpose and intent seem to be playing some role in his opinion, 
although that role is hidden and unelaborated. 
v. Graham Cty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist., 528 F.3d 292, 302 (4th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 559 U.S.
280 (2010))). 
134. Yates, 574 U.S. at 549–50 (Alito, J., concurring). 
135. Id. at 550.
 136. Id. at 551.
 137. Id.
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And such backdoor purposivism often seems to have been at work
when the textualist and textualist-leaning members of the Roberts 
Court employed the noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis canons. In a 
sense, this should be unsurprising, because any time a court seeks to 
identify the common thread or theme connecting the words in a
statutory list, it necessarily will end up determining—even if only 
indirectly—the goal it believes the legislature intended to accomplish. 
Indeed, the very task of articulating a common denominator is an 
exercise in searching for—and perhaps manufacturing—statutory
purpose. Further, it is an exercise that leaves significant discretion in 
judges’ hands: judges are free to decide what common feature they
think does, or should, connect the items in the list, to articulate that
feature at whatever level of generality they deem appropriate, and to 
assert that the feature they identify is the one Congress had in mind 
when it wrote the statute. This is precisely the kind of discretionary
free-for-all that textualists complain attends purposivist judges’ efforts 
to identify statutory purpose through traditional purposive tools such
as legislative history and preambles: by articulating a broad, general
connecting thread, a textualist judge can ensure that a statute is given
a wide reach (or vice versa), just as a purposivist judge can ensure that 
a statute is given a broad or narrow reach by articulating a statutory
purpose at a high or low level of generality.138 Part IV explores the
theoretical implications of this surprising parallel in how both
textualists and purposivists supplement ordinary meaning.  
B. The Whole Act Rule 
The whole act rule refers to a series of inferences that courts may 
draw about the meaning of one section of a statute based on how other 
sections of the statute are structured.139 The members of the Roberts 
Court referenced whole-act-rule arguments in 27 percent (269 of 995) 
of the opinions they authored during the period between January 31,
2006 and July 1, 2017.140 In many of these cases and opinions, the Court 
or its textualist and textualist-leaning Justices used the whole act rule
in a manner that evoked or presumed Congress’s intent. 
138. Cf. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 26, at 18–19 (criticizing purposivists for manipulating 
the level of generality at which they articulate the statute’s purpose in order to reach their
preferred reading of the text). 
139. ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., supra note 15, at 674–79. 
140. See supra Table 1.
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The most common formulation was as follows: the Court noted 
that X provision did not contain A limitation or requirement, while Y 
neighboring, similar provision of the statute did contain A limitation
or requirement; the Court then reasoned that where one provision of a
statute expressly states A, and another similar provision of the statute 
does not expressly state A, that difference should be viewed as 
deliberate and intentional—or, in a stronger version, should be taken
to demonstrate that Congress did not intend for X provision to contain 
A limitation or requirement. This is sometimes referred to as the 
“meaningful variation” subset of the whole act rule.141 The Court is
essentially arguing that Congress must not have intended—or that it
does not make sense for—X statutory provision to include A.142 The
meaningful-variation formulation is a standard logical inference, but it
is by no means the only, inevitable inference one could draw from such
statutory differences—nor does it necessarily accurately reflect 
Congress’s actual method of drafting statutes.143 Indeed, members of
the Roberts Court regularly disagreed with each other about what 
precise inference should be drawn from the inclusion of limitation A in
one provision but not another.144 
141. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., supra note 15, at 678 (describing the meaningful-variation 
maxim as imposing a “presumption that a change of wording denotes a change in meaning” 
(quoting P. ST. J. LANGAN, MAXWELL ON THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 282 (12th ed.
1969)); Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of Supreme
Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967–2011, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1317, 1447–48 (2014); 
Krishnakumar, Dueling Canons, supra note 75, at 967; Deborah A. Widiss, Undermining
Congressional Overrides: The Hydra Problem in Statutory Interpretation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 859, 873
(2012). 
142. It is also possible to understand the Court to be saying that, given the statutory structure,
“a reasonable reader” could not read the provision to include A. But even that formulation
presumes congressional deliberateness and, more importantly, enables the Court to exercise
significant judicial discretion over statutory meaning because meaningful variation is hardly the
only, inevitable inference one could draw from Congress’s disparate treatment of provisions X
and Y.
 143. Cf. Christiansen & Eskridge, Jr., supra note 141, at 1448 (concluding that the meaningful-
variation presumption is difficult to apply, even when congressional staff are aware of the canon,
because different congressional committees are often involved in drafting different parts of the
statute); Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 
901, 936 (2013) (reporting that judicial presumptions about internal consistency across statutory 
provisions fail to account for how Congress actually drafts statutes).
 144. See Krishnakumar, Dueling Canons, supra note 75, at 967–70 (describing how competing 
opinions in the same case sometimes “duel” over the meaning of such discrepancies between 
similar statutory provisions and providing as examples Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009),
and Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568 (2009)). 
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The Court’s competing statutory constructions in Dean v. United 
States145 provide a good example. Dean involved a sentencing-
enhancement statute with three subparts: the first imposes a five-year 
mandatory-minimum enhancement if a firearm is “use[d] or carrie[d]” 
during and in relation to a violent crime, the second increases the 
enhancement to seven years “if the firearm is brandished,” and the
third increases the enhancement to ten years “if the firearm is 
discharged.”146 At issue was whether the ten-year mandatory 
enhancement applies if the gun is discharged accidentally, or whether 
there is an intent requirement for the ten-year enhancement.147 A 
majority of the Court, in an opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts 
and joined by all of the other textualist-leaning Justices, interpreted the 
statute not to contain an intent requirement, relying significantly on a 
“meaningful variation” argument.148 Justice Roberts’s opinion pointed
to the “is brandished” clause immediately preceding the “is 
discharged” clause and noted that the former expressly includes an
intent requirement because the brandishing must be done “in order to
intimidate.”149 The majority presumed that Congress’s failure to
include a similar intent requirement in the “is discharged” clause was 
intentional and deliberate.150 
Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion in Dean also relied heavily on
the whole act rule and the contrast between the express-intent 
requirement in the “is brandished” clause versus the lack of such a 
requirement in the “is discharged” clause—but drew very different 
inferences from this disparate drafting. In contrast to the majority,
Justice Stevens began with an intent-through-statutory-structure
argument, maintaining that the three enhancement clauses, taken 
together, evinced a congressional intent to provide escalating 
mandatory sentences for increasingly culpable conduct.151 Accordingly,
he read the intent requirement in the “is brandished” provision as 
evidence that the “is discharged” clause also must contain an intent
requirement—because unintentional discharges are less culpable than
intentional brandishing, and it would be nonsensical for clause (iii) to
145. Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568 (2009).
 146. Id. at 571 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)). 
147. Id.
 148. Id. at 572–73, 577.
 149. Id. at 572–73 (emphasis in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(4)).
 150. Id. at 573.
 151. Id. at 578–79 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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impose a higher sentence for conduct that is less culpable than that
described in clause (ii).152 This intent argument was backed up with
legislative history about how the statute came to be enacted, as 
discussed below.153 
Notably, the majority opinion also made another language-canon 
argument that linked to congressional intent—one based on grammar 
rules and the fact that the “discharge” clause is written in the passive 
voice. Noting that “[t]he passive voice focuses on an event that occurs 
without respect to a specific actor, and therefore without respect to any 
actor’s intent or culpability,” the majority insisted that Congress’s 
decision to frame the “discharge” clause in the passive voice
demonstrated that the clause did not require proof that the discharge 
was intentional.154 In other words, the majority used a grammar
principle—that the passive voice focuses on the action rather than the 
actor—to infer that Congress must not have cared about the mental 
state of the defendant when it drafted the clause at issue. 
Ultimately, the inferences that Justices Roberts and Stevens drew
from the statutory text seem to depend less on grammar rules or logical 
inferences than on the Justices’ personal views about the level of 
culpability associated with an accidental discharge of a gun. Indeed, the 
opposing opinions in the case appear to impute to Congress the 
purpose or design that each Justice believed made the most sense or 
worked the fairest result in light of his own views about the 
blameworthiness of the defendant’s conduct. Chief Justice Roberts’s
majority opinion, for example, contains several clues that he viewed 
the accidental discharge at issue as highly culpable. Specifically, he 
noted that “[t]he fact that the actual discharge of a gun covered under 
§ 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) may be accidental does not mean that the defendant 
is blameless”; “[a]n individual who brings a loaded weapon to commit 
a crime runs the risk that the gun will discharge accidentally”; and “the
defendant is already guilty of unlawful conduct twice over.”155 
Conversely, Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion contains comments 
indicating that he viewed the accidental discharge as less blameworthy, 
including the criticism that the majority’s ruling subjects the petitioner 
to an increased sentence “for an accident that caused no harm”156 and 
152. Id. at 579.
 153. Id.; see infra note 165 and accompanying text. 
154. Dean, 556 U.S. at 572. 
155. Id. at 576 (emphasis added).
 156. Id. at 578 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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the insistence that a crime requires the “concurrence of an evil-
meaning mind with an evil-doing hand.”157 Thus, as with the noscitur a
sociis and ejusdem generis canons, the Court’s application of the whole 
act rule left significant room for judicial discretion and presumption of
a legislative intent that corresponded to the Justices’ own normative
preferences.158 
Textualist Justices also use other forms of the whole act rule, in
addition to the meaningful-variation test, to make inferences and 
assumptions about congressional intent. They sometimes, for example,
combined observations about a statute’s structure with a negative-
inference language canon159 to argue that Congress’s attention to detail
or express coverage of certain subjects indicated its intent not to cover 
other subjects.160 Similarly, they sometimes employed the rule against 
superfluities to assume that Congress could not have intended an
interpretation that would cause overlap, or duplicative coverage, by
two separate sections of the same statute.161 Importantly, textualist and
purposivist Justices continue to employ the whole act rule to impute
intent to Congress despite evidence indicating that Congress is 
frequently repetitive in its drafting and often does intend for two
different statutory provisions to overlap in their coverage. Indeed, a
recent empirical study of congressional drafting practices based on
interviews with congressional staffers found that drafters sometimes 
157. Id. at 580 (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251–52 (1952)).
 158. See Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 384, 389–90, 409–10 (2009) (containing majority and 
dissenting opinions that draw opposing inferences based on the whole act rule).
159. The canon, known as expressio unius est exclusio alterius, provides that the expression of 
one thing indicates the exclusion of others. See ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., supra note 15, at 668.
 160. See, e.g., Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664, 1675 (2017) (“The BPCIA’s
‘carefully crafted and detailed enforcement scheme provides strong evidence that Congress did
not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate expressly.’” (quoting
Great-W. Life & Annuity Ins. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 209 (2002))); Elgin v. Dep’t of Treasury, 
567 U.S. 1, 11–12 (2012) (“Given the painstaking detail with which the CSRA sets out the method
for covered employees to obtain review of adverse employment actions, it is fairly discernible that
Congress intended to deny such employees an additional avenue of review in district court.”); 
CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685, 708 (2011) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (concluding 
that where a statute expressly abrogated numerous common law doctrines, its failure to expressly
abrogate a proximate cause requirement shows that Congress intended to retain that common
law doctrine); Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 232–33 (2011) (similar); Credit Suisse Sec.
(USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 289–90 (2007) (“Other provisions in both Acts . . . suggest
that Congress explicitly referred to States when it intended to impose a state-law limitation.”).
 161. See, e.g., Water Splash, Inc. v. Menon, 137 S. Ct. 1504, 1509 (2017) (“[I]n order for Article 
10(a) to do any work, it must pertain to sending documents for the purposes of service.”); Ali v.
Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 232 (2008) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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intentionally err on the side of redundancy.162 Staffers gave several 
reasons for such deliberate repetitiveness, including the need to 
“capture the universe,” “because you just want to be sure you hit it,”
or because “politically for compromise they must include certain words 
in the statute—that senator, that constituent, that lobbyist wants to see
that word.”163 This disconnect between the whole act rule’s directive 
and the way statutes are actually drafted is markedly at odds with the
Justices’ insistence that Congress “must have” or “could not have” 
intended X interpretation of provision A because it is inconsistent with
how provision B is drafted.164 
Equally troubling, when the Court employs whole-act-rule 
arguments, it tends to do so in a manner that gives the appearance that 
the reading it is adopting is the one inevitably dictated by the statute’s 
structure—that X structural pattern inexorably reflects Y intent or 
meaning—and tends to downplay the work that inferences and 
assumptions about the statute’s scope and Congress’s intent are 
performing. Such claims to objectivity and inevitability are problematic 
because they cast a false aura of neutrality over the Court’s 
interpretation and obscure the judicial discretion and speculation
inherent in the Court’s analysis. 
Purposivist Justices also inevitably used the whole act rule to
assert or speculate about congressional intent and statutory purpose.
But when they did so, they tended to ground their arguments about 
statutory purpose or intent in other interpretive tools, and to be open
about their reliance on purpose or intent, instead of giving the 
impression that their statutory construction was based on the 
application of neutral, objective textual canons alone. In the Dean case 
discussed above, for example, Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion cited 
legislative history to support its contention that Congress intended for 
the statute to impose increasingly harsh punishments on increasingly 
culpable conduct.165 Similarly, Justice Ginsburg’s plurality opinion in 
Yates, discussed earlier, married numerous whole-act-rule
arguments—based on the evidence-tampering provision’s title, overlap
162. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 143, at 934.
 163. See id. at 934 (quoting respondents in a survey of congressional staffers). 
164. See sources cited supra note 160. 
165. See Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568, 579 (2009) (noting that a sentencing 
enhancement was enacted to override the Court’s ruling in Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137
(1995), by imposing a five-year enhancement for simple possession of a firearm and additional
penalties for more culpable behavior described in Bailey, including brandishing and actual
discharge).
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with a neighboring provision, and even its position within the criminal
code166—with an open and frank emphasis on the provision’s purpose
and citations to the legislative history.167 By contrast, textualist-leaning 
Justice Alito’s concurring opinion in Yates simply asserted that the 
terms “alters” and “falsifies” must be “closely associated with 
filekeeping”—relying on the noscitur a sociis canon, without 
supporting legislative history or motivating mischief, to reach the same 
outcome.168 
This is not to say that textualist-leaning Justices never openly link 
whole-act-rule arguments to statutory purpose, only that it is rare for 
them to do so.169 In fact, when textualist or textualist-leaning Justices
do rely openly on statutory purpose, this unusual behavior tends to get 
noticed. Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion in King v. Burwell,170 
for example, garnered significant attention from scholars and 
commentators—and drew sharp criticism from textualists171—precisely
because of its unusually frank reliance on a purposive interpretive 
methodology.172 While this kind of open linkage between statutory 
purpose and the whole act rule is rare, it serves as further evidence that 
textualist and textualist-leaning Justices regularly use whole-act-rule
arguments to go beyond the mere text of the statute—and to opine 
about Congress’s intent. 
C. Practical Consequences 
The textualist and textualist-leaning Justices on the Roberts Court 
regularly invoked practical reasoning in the opinions they authored— 
166. Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 539–43 (2015) (plurality opinion). 
167. Id. at 535 (discussing the statute’s Enron-related origins); id. at 540–42 (citing a Senate 
Report and the Congressional Record); see also Howard Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins.
Co., 547 U.S. 651, 658–59 (2006) (Ginsburg, J.) (discussing the legislative history of the 1978
Bankruptcy Act amendments).
 168. Yates, 574 U.S. at 551 (Alito, J., concurring). 
169. There were 151 opinions in the dataset in which a textualist or textualist-leaning Justice
employed the whole act rule; of these only 39 (25.8 percent) openly referenced the statute’s
purpose. Twenty-four of these 39 were opinions authored by Justices Kennedy (14) or Alito (10).
170. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
 171. See supra note 11. 
172. King raised the question whether the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) authorizes payment
of health-insurance subsidies to qualified individuals who purchase health insurance through an
exchange established by the federal—as opposed to state—government. 135 S. Ct. at 2487–88. 
Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion began with a purposive foray into the background
history of the ACA, including lessons Congress learned from states’ experiences with health-
insurance regulation during the 1990s, and then tied those lessons to the statute’s specific
provisions. Id. at 2485–86. 
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referencing the practical consequences that an interpretation would
produce in 31.2 percent of their opinions.173 This in itself is significant,
because practical considerations are entirely external to the statutory 
text and because textualists regularly denounce consequentialism as an
inappropriate basis for judicial decision-making.174 But what is more
interesting, for our purposes, is that the textualist Justices often 
deployed practical consequences arguments in a manner that, at least 
implicitly and sometimes explicitly, presumed or imputed a specific 
purpose or intent to Congress. 
The Court’s intent-through-practical-consequences reasoning has
tended to take one of two forms: (1) an absurd-results argument in
which the Court insists that Congress could not have intended for the 
statute to mean X because X produces nonsensical results; or (2) a 
practical-consequences-with-a-dash-of-purpose argument in which the 
Court contends that a statute cannot mean X because X interpretation 
would be inconsistent with the statute’s (presumed) underlying policy 
objectives. This Section discusses each of these forms of practical 
consequences arguments in turn. 
1. Absurd Results. The absurd-results form of intent-imputing-
practical-consequences argument has typically followed this pattern: 
the Court declares that it is adopting Y construction of a statute— 
explaining that X alternate construction would lead to absurd, 
incoherent, or otherwise unacceptable results—and then pivots to 
insist that these results would be so “topsy-turvy,” “calamitous,” or 
nonsensical, or would undermine Congress’s statutory design so 
significantly, that Congress could not possibly have intended for the 
statute to mean X. 
Consider a few examples: 
In Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White,175 the
Court interpreted Title VII’s antiretaliation provision, which forbids 
“discriminat[ion] against” an employee who has “made a charge, 
testified, assisted, or participated in” a Title VII proceeding or 
investigation.176 The plaintiff was the only female employee who 
173. See supra Table 1.
 174. See, e.g., Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 141 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I
do not think, however, that the avoidance of unhappy consequences is adequate basis for
interpreting a text.”); Manning, Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 26, at 2388–89 (criticizing the 
absurd-results exception to the plain meaning rule).
175. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
 176. Id. at 56 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a)).
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operated the forklift at Burlington Northern’s Tennessee Yard. She
alleged that after she complained of sexual harassment by her 
supervisor, she was transferred from forklift duty to standard track-
laborer tasks.177 The statutory issue was whether a plaintiff alleging
retaliation is required to show that the employer took an “adverse 
employment action”—as is required for substantive employment 
discrimination claims under Title VII—or whether retaliation can take 
other forms, such as reassigning an employee’s duties.178 The Court, in 
an opinion authored by Justice Breyer, ruled that retaliation claims,
unlike substantive discrimination claims, can take other forms besides 
adverse employment action.179 In so ruling, it articulated the following 
test for evaluating retaliation claims: “a plaintiff must show that a 
reasonable employee would have found the challenged action 
materially adverse, ‘which in this context means it well might have 
dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination.’”180 It then concluded that the plaintiff had met this 
test.181 
Justice Alito concurred, agreeing that the plaintiff had met the 
conditions necessary for asserting a retaliation claim, but disagreed
with the Court’s test.182 After faulting the majority’s statutory
construction for lacking a “sound [textual] basis,”183 he compared the 
language and purpose of the antiretaliation and substantive 
discrimination provisions and criticized the practical consequences that 
the Court’s construction would produce. Along the way, he made 
several assumptions about Congress’s intent.184 Specifically, Justice
Alito argued that the majority’s test “leads logically to perverse
results” because it sets up a situation in which the degree of protection
afforded a retaliation victim is “inversely proportional to the severity
of the original act of discrimination.”185 He reasoned that employees 
177. Id. at 57–58. 
178. Id. at 57, 60 (discussing the extent of the phrase “discriminate against” in Title VII’s 
antiretaliation provision).
 179. Id. at 64–65 (“[T]he antiretaliation provision, unlike the substantive provision, is not
limited to discriminatory actions that affect the terms and conditions of employment.”). 
180. Id. at 68 (emphasis added) (quoting Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 
2006)). 
181. Id. at 70 (finding sufficient evidence to support the jury’s determination that the 
challenged actions were materially adverse).
 182. Id. at 80 (Alito, J., concurring). 
183. Id. at 77. 
184. See id. at 77–78. 
185. Id.
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who had faced severe discrimination would not easily be dissuaded 
from filing discrimination charges because the benefits of filing are 
high in such cases, and that such employees therefore would have a
hard time meeting the “only those retaliatory acts that would dissuade
a reasonable worker” standard.186 By contrast, employees who faced 
milder forms of discrimination might more easily be dissuaded from
filing charges because the costs of filing might outweigh the benefits 
when the discriminatory harm is mild.187 “These topsy-turvy results,”
he argued, “make no sense.”188 Justice Alito also criticized the
majority’s test on the ground that it created a “loose” and “unclear” 
causation standard that would prove difficult to implement.189 Taken 
together, he insisted, “[t]he practical consequences of the test that the 
majority adopts strongly suggest that this test is not what Congress 
intended.”190 
Justice Alito’s practical-reasoning-infused-with-intent argument 
goes far beyond the semantic context that Manning described as the 
defining feature of modern textualism. It focuses not on what meaning 
an objectively reasonable user of words would understand the statutory 
term “discriminate against” to mean but rather on the policy
consequences that the majority’s construction of that statutory term 
would engender. In that sense, Justice Alito’s reasoning is very much
based on the kind of “policy context” that Manning contends 
purposivist judges privilege191—rather than on the “semantic context”
that is supposed to be at the core of textualist analysis. Moreover, it 
substitutes Justice Alito’s intuition about what constitutes a “topsy-
turvy” or unacceptably confusing test for Congress’s. 
Justice Thomas’s dissenting opinion in Gonzalez v. United States192 
made a similar absurd-results argument that indirectly circled around
to congressional intent. Gonzalez raised the question whether the 
Federal Magistrate Act (“FMA”) delegates authority to magistrate
judges to preside over juror selection in felony criminal trials, or 
whether the defendant’s personal consent is required.193 A majority of 
186. Id.
 187. Id. at 78. 
188. Id.
 189. Id. at 79. 
190. Id. at 77 (emphasis added). 
191. See supra notes 36–40 and accompanying text. 
192. Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242 (2008).
 193. Id. at 244–45. 
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the Court ruled that consent by defense counsel alone is enough.194 
Justice Thomas dissented, noting among other things that another
section of the FMA required the defendant’s express, informed
consent before a magistrate judge may conduct a misdemeanor trial.195 
Justice Thomas called it “ironic” to conclude that Congress permitted
delegation of felony jury selection upon a lesser showing of consent 
than that required for delegation in a misdemeanor trial.196 Rather, he 
argued, “Congress’ silence is particularly telling,”197 and “Congress 
undoubtedly would have adopted something akin to [the misdemeanor 
provision’s] requirements” if it had in fact meant to authorize
delegation of felony jury selection.198 In other words, Justice Thomas
reasoned that the incongruity of differential treatment for felony and
misdemeanor trials constituted powerful evidence that Congress did
not in fact mean to delegate the right to preside over felony trials to 
magistrate judges. As in Burlington Northern, this type of “X reading 
would produce a nonsensical result, that I do not think Congress could 
have intended” reasoning does more than merely infer legislative
intent from the statute’s text or identify the meaning that a reasonably
informed reader would attribute to the language at issue. Instead, it
ignores the absence of an express informed-consent requirement in the 
statute’s text and fashions one out of whole cloth in order to make 
sense of the statute.199 This is the kind of move that purposivist judges 
194. Id. at 250.
 195. Id. at 262 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
 196. Id. at 264.
 197. Id. at 262.
 198. Id. at 265.
 199. See, e.g., Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. ANZ Sec., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 2042, 2054 (2017) 
(determining that the petitioner’s reading would allow actions filed decades after an original
securities offering and concluding that “Congress would not have intended this result”); Kellogg 
Brown & Root Servs., Inc. v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1970, 1979 (2015) (determining that the 
petitioner’s interpretation “would lead to strange results that Congress is unlikely to have
wanted”); King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 (2015) (showing that the adopted construction is
necessary “to avoid the type of calamitous result that Congress plainly meant to avoid”); POM
Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 573 U.S. 102, 116 (2014) (finding that an alternate construction
“would lead to a result that Congress likely did not intend”); Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 569 U.S. 
513, 528 (2013) (similar); Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 516 (2011) (“This unnecessary period of
inaction would delay an eventual remedy and would prolong the courts’ involvement . . . .
Congress did not require this unreasonable result . . . .”); Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 203 
(2011) (Alito, J., concurring) (similar); Sykes v. United States, 546 U.S. 1, 17–21 (2011) (using 
crime statistics and the Court’s own views about dangerousness to conclude that Congress
intended a sentencing enhancement to apply to vehicular-flight offenses); Hamilton v. Lanning,
560 U.S. 505, 520 (2010) (“[T]he mechanical approach would produce senseless results that we do
not think Congress intended.”); Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320, 356 (2010) (Kennedy, J., 
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typically make and that textualists usually criticize as inconsistent with
the judicial role.200 
2. Presumed Legislative Objectives. Absurd-results arguments are
not the only form of practical consequences reasoning that textualist 
Justices used to impute or assume congressional purpose or intent. A
second form focused more closely on a presumed legislative objective. 
In these cases, the Court tended to describe certain consequences that 
X interpretation would produce, and then assert that those 
consequences would undermine a specific policy goal. The typical 
formulation was as follows: 
• X interpretation would produce B practical consequences, and
• B practical consequences are inconsistent with goal A, which the 
statute at issue is designed to achieve, and 
• X interpretation therefore cannot be correct. 
In other words, the problem with X interpretation is not that it 
produces absurd or illogical results but, rather, that it produces results 
that conflict with a statutory goal or aim that the Court imputes to the 
statute. An example should help illustrate. In Credit Suisse Securities 
(USA) LLC v. Simmonds,201 the Court considered § 16(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which authorizes security holders to 
bring suit against the officers, directors, and certain beneficial owners 
of a corporation who realize any profits from the purchase or sale of 
the corporation’s securities.202 The statute requires that suits be 
brought within “two years after the date such profit was realized.”203 
The question at issue was whether § 16(b)’s limitations period is tolled
until the insider discloses his transactions in a § 16(a) filing, or whether 
it begins to run when the plaintiff knows or should know of the conduct 
at issue.204 
dissenting) (“The Court is mistaken in concluding that Congress . . . would have intended this
irrational result.”); Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 316 (2009) (similar).
 200. See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 26, at 22 (criticizing purposivists for
“purport[ing] to give effect to . . . the sensible, workable outcomes that [the legislature] surely
intended”).
201. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Simmonds, 566 U.S. 221 (2012).
 202. Id. at 223.
 203. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b)).
 204. Id. at 225.
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In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Scalia, the Court held 
that the limitations period begins to run when the plaintiff knows or 
should know of the corporate officer’s conduct, even if the officer has 
not yet filed the disclosures required under the statute.205 In so ruling,
the Court noted the practical potential for “endless tolling” that would
result if the limitations period were tolled pending disclosure, even
when plaintiffs knew of defendants’ profiteering conduct in the 
interim.206 Such “endless tolling,” the Court argued, would be
“inconsistent” and “out of step” with the purpose of statutes of
limitations—which, the Court maintained, is to protect defendants 
against stale or unduly delayed claims.207 Notably, this type of practical-
consequences-based purposive argument is different from the manner 
in which purposivist Justices typically invoke statutory purpose in that 
it does not begin with or spend significant time developing the statute’s
purpose; rather, it begins with practical reasoning and backs into an 
inference about the statute’s design or scope. Part IV explores this
difference in greater detail. 
Academic textualist John Manning has argued that judicial
invocation of the absurd-results doctrine is a version of strong
intentionalism, and that in order to stay true to their core
commitments, textualists must cease using it as an interpretive escape
hatch.208 This Article’s observation is related to but broader than 
Manning’s in two important ways. First, the cases coded as containing 
practical-consequences reasoning in my dataset encompass more than
merely “absurd results” arguments—they also include arguments that
205. Id. at 225–28. 
206. Id. at 227.
 207. Id. at 227–28. There are several other similar examples in which the Court wove together
purposive and practical consequences arguments. See Conkright v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506, 507 
(2010) (finding that deferential review of the ERISA plan administrator’s interpretations
promotes efficiency, predictability, and consistency of interpretations across jurisdictions—in
keeping with ERISA’s goal of ensuring uniformity in plan administration); Perdue v. Kenny A.
ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 558–59 (2010) (finding that attorneys’ fees enhancements above a 
“lodestar” amount would “serve only to enrich attorneys” and conflict with the statute’s aim of
ensuring that litigants without means can vindicate their rights); Gonzalez v. United States, 553
U.S. 242, 249–50, 252 (2008) (noting that “[t]he adversary process could not function effectively
if every tactical decision required client approval” and the Federal Magistrates Act “evinces a 
congressional belief that magistrates are well qualified to handle matters of similar importance to
jury selection” (first quoting Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 418 (1988), and then quoting Peretz
v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 935 (1991))). 
208. See, e.g., Manning, Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 26, at 2390 (“Textualists therefore 
believe that the only safe course for a faithful agent is to enforce the clear terms of the statutes
that have emerged from [the legislative] process.”).
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a rejected statutory interpretation would produce results that are 
“ironic” or inconsistent with a statute’s design or goals. Second, this 
Article has sought to show that there is more than just intentionalism 
at work when the Court invokes practical reasoning to justify its 
statutory reading; there is also usually some judicial speculation about
or construction of a statutory purpose or policy objective.
The intent-through-practical-consequences and pragmatic-
reasoning-with-a-dash-of-purpose arguments described in this Section 
also are employed by the purposivist Justices in a number of cases— 
indicating that this is a Court-wide phenomenon.209 But purposivist 
Justices’ use of intent and purpose, even indirectly through practical 
consequences arguments, is to be expected. By contrast, the textualist 
Justices’ backdoor references to purpose and intent are far more
interesting and unanticipated because textualism decries the legitimacy
of non-text-based speculation about legislative intent and purpose.210 
And while pragmatic considerations always are about whether an
interpretation is reasonable in the judge’s eyes, what the cases 
discussed above demonstrate is that textualist judges are taking their
reasonableness arguments one step further—and connecting them to
Congress’s intent or design. At times, when employing an absurd-
results argument, their nod to legislative intent appears to be more of 
a throwaway assertion, perhaps designed to demonstrate that despite 
their atextual, pragmatic musings, textualist Justices are being faithful 
agents of the legislature. When the Court’s textualists follow the XYZ-
practical-consequences-would-undermine-the-statute’s-purpose form 
of reasoning, by contrast, their attempt to connect their reasoning to 
the legislature’s specific purpose seems to be a key component of the 
practical argument itself, used to justify or convince readers that the
209. See, e.g., Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 571 U.S. 161, 171 (2014)
(discussing how the Court’s rejected interpretation would have rendered the statute’s
requirement “an administrative nightmare that Congress could not possibly have intended”);
Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 200 (2013) (arguing that the government’s approach “leads
to consequences Congress could not have intended”); Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 568 
U.S. 145, 163 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[A] contrary approach could have odd practical 
consequences and would attribute a strange intent to Congress . . . .”); Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 
562 U.S. 223, 250 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Because nothing . . . remotely suggests that
Congress intended such a result, I respectfully dissent.”); Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 
251 (2008) (“We resist attributing to Congress an intention to render a statute so internally
inconsistent.”); Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 248 (2007) (rejecting an interpretation that “would
make scant sense”). 
210. See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 26, at 343–46, 369–96 (labeling the use of 
legislative history, purpose, and intent as a “false notion”).
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negative consequence identified is in fact disqualifying. The theoretical 
implications of textualists’ indirect use of purpose and intent are 
explored in further detail in Part IV.  
* * * 
Some might question how much work backdoor inferences about 
congressional purpose or intent are actually doing in the cases in which
they are used by textualist Justices. That is, they might wonder whether 
purpose-infused Latin canons, the whole act rule, or practical 
consequences arguments are driving the interpretation at issue, or are
merely secondary arguments made to support an interpretation arrived
at primarily through other interpretive resources. In order to account 
for this possibility, each opinion involving a language canon, whole-act-
rule argument, or practical consequences argument was coded for the
weight it placed on that interpretive tool: “minimal,” “some,” or 
“heavy.” While this coding necessarily involved some judgment calls, I
believe that it adds valuable texture to our understanding of how the 
Court uses these canons and tools. 
The coding parameters were as follows: an opinion was coded as
containing “passing or minimal reliance” on the whole act rule, a 
language canon, or practical reasoning if it made minimal reference to
the canon or mentioned it as a fallback or add-on argument; an opinion
was coded as involving “some reliance” on the relevant interpretive 
tool if it made more than minimal reference to the canon or tool, but 
did not rely on the canon or tool as the main justification for the 
construction it adopted; finally, an opinion was coded as containing 
“heavy or primary reliance” if it relied primarily or heavily on the 
canon or tool to justify the result reached.211 Table 3b below reports the
211. An example may help illustrate. In Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S.
142 (2012), the Court relied prominently on comparisons to other sections of the FLSA, the 
meaning of the term “any,” and the ejusdem generis canon to interpret a provision of the FLSA
that defined “sale” to “include[] any sale, exchange, contract to sell, consignment for sale,
shipment for sale, or other disposition.” Id. at 148, 162–64 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 203(k)). Based on 
these linguistic and whole act considerations, the Court concluded that “the catchall phrase ‘other
disposition’ is most reasonably interpreted as including those arrangements that are tantamount,
in a particular industry, to a paradigmatic sale of a commodity,” and found that the 
pharmaceutical-sales detailers whose employment was at issue in the case thus constituted
“outside salesmen” whose work was exempt from the overtime wage provisions of the FLSA. Id.
at 164–65. The Court also noted, at the end of its opinion, that it would be “anomalous” to require
overtime compensation for the pharmaceutical-sales detailers while at the same time exempting
other employees who perform identical work except for the fact that the drugs they sell are
administered by physicians rather than sold through a pharmacy with a prescription. Id. at 166. 
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results of this coding for opinions authored by the textualist and 
textualist-leaning Justices. 
Table 3b
Relative Weight Placed on Language Canons, Whole Act Rule, 
and Practical Consequences by Textualist Justices 
Minimal Reliance Some Reliance Heavy Reliance 
(n=35) (n=27) (n=25)
Opinions 16.7% 42.6% 40.7%
That Reference (n=9) (n=23) (n=22)
Language Canons
(n=54)
43.3% 38.7%Opinions That 
(n=65) (n=58)Reference the
Whole Act Rule 
(n=150) 
Opinions That  25.6% 45.7% 28.7%
Reference Practica (n=42) (n=75) (n=47)
Consequences 
(n=164) 
As Table 3b shows, in the vast majority—over 75 percent—of the
opinions in which textualist and textualist-leaning Justices employed 
language canons, the whole act rule, or practical consequences to
construe a statute, they placed either “heavy” or “some” weight on 
these interpretive tools. Based on this crude measure, it appears that 
when the textualist and textualist-leaning Justices invoked the canons
or tools that this Article has highlighted as susceptible to backdoor 
purposivism, they tended to rely on those tools in a meaningful way— 
and only occasionally to use them as secondary or “bonus” arguments.
This still begs the question of how frequently textualist Justices 
actually invoke the interpretive canons and tools that invite judicial 
speculation about purpose, intent, or both. That is a fair question; some
of the canons discussed in this Part—such as the Latin canons—are
The Court’s opinion was coded as placing “heavy or primary” reliance on language canons and
the whole act rule and as placing “passing or minimal” reliance on practical consequences.
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available in only a subset of the statutory cases that come before the 
Court and may be used only infrequently. The data reveal that the 
textualist Justices employed the language canons as a whole, including 
both the Latin canons and grammar canons, in 10.3 percent of the
opinions they authored; they employed the whole act rule in 28.9 
percent of the opinions they authored; and employed practical 
consequences in 31.2 percent of the opinions they authored.212 Notably, 
arguments based on the whole act rule and practical reasoning are 
available in nearly every case—with the result that purposivism can 
creep into the textualist analysis more frequently than one might think, 
even if not in every case.
IV. SOME IMPLICATIONS 
As the cases discussed in Part III demonstrate, there is more to the 
story of how the U.S. Supreme Court uses purpose and intent in the
age of textualism than statutory interpretation theory has thus far 
acknowledged. Textualists have not simply succeeded in confining 
purpose-based inquiries to a narrow analysis of the means that 
Congress provided for the statute’s implementation, as John Manning 
suggests.213 Nor is it the case that the Court as a whole has simply
shifted its focus from interpreting statutes in light of their underlying 
purposes to using purpose and practical reasoning to evaluate
ambiguity in a statute’s text, as Richard Re has suggested.214 While
some cases undoubtedly follow these patterns, there is more at work in
the Court’s—and particularly textualist Justices’—treatment of 
purpose and intent than such theories account for. Indeed, the cases
described in Part III suggest that textualist Justices sometimes 
articulate Congress’s ulterior purpose and intent based on their own
personal views about a statute’s sensibility or their own judgment calls 
about what a statutory provision is designed to achieve.
These revelations stand in stark contrast to textualism’s standard
criticism of purposive interpretive tools—that they confer excessive
212. See supra Table 1. A recent study that searched Westlaw’s database of all federal court 
opinions found that between January 1, 2000, and September 29, 2015, federal judges employed
the ejusdem generis canon 458 times, the noscitur a sociis canon 296 times, and the whole act rule
4291 times. See John M. Golden, Redundancy: When Law Repeats Itself, 94 TEX. L. REV. 629, 
653–54 & nn. 94 & 97 (2016). The figures for the Latin canons are likely understated, moreover,
because the study captured only those cases that explicitly referenced the canons, and it is not
uncommon for judges to employ the noscitur and ejusdem concepts without naming them.
 213. See supra notes 48–54 and accompanying text. 
214. See supra notes 55–61 and accompanying text.
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discretion on judges and empower them to decide cases based on
personal preferences rather than objective, neutral rules. Section A of 
this Part posits that textualist Justices’ use of practical reasoning and
language canons to infer purpose confers just as much discretion on 
judges as do purposivist-preferred interpretive tools such as legislative 
history or the mischief rule. Section B cautions that traditional textual 
canons often obscure the hidden normative baselines that influence 
how the Justices construe a statute, throwing a neutral, objective
façade over policy-based or even ideological opinions. Section C turns 
to the question of what divides textualists from purposivists and 
suggests that the answer may be less than we think. That is, what 
separates textualists from purposivists may be merely their level of
comfort with particular interpretive sources and the order in which
they invoke legislative purpose in their statutory reasoning. In other 
words, there may be a divide, or more accurately a continuum, with 
respect to the sources individual Justices are willing to consult in their 
common search for Congress’s specific intent—rather than a clean 
break between textualists’ emphasis on objective meaning versus 
purposivists’ emphasis on legislative policy goals and sensible 
outcomes. Further, there may be a difference among the Justices
regarding whether they lead with statutory purpose or merely back into 
it as an interpretive aid or justification. The Section ends by evaluating
whether these differences are material.
A. Judicial Discretion 
As discussed in Part I, textualism is a formalist theory that focuses 
on the ordinary meaning of a statute’s text and prides itself on its ability 
to cabin judicial discretion through the use of neutral, objective 
interpretive tools.215 And yet the cases discussed in Part III reveal that 
textualist Justices regularly venture beyond the bounds of neutral, 
objective analysis to speculate and make judgment calls about
Congress’s purpose, intent, and the sensibility of particular interpretive 
215. See, e.g., Eskridge, Jr., New Textualism, supra note 47, at 674 (“According to the new 
textualists, consideration of legislative history creates greater opportunities for the exercise of
judicial discretion. . . . A focus on the text alone, it is argued, is a more concrete inquiry which will
better constrain the tendency of judges to substitute their will for that of Congress.”); Peter J.
Smith, Textualism and Jurisdiction, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1883, 1902 (2008) (“In elevating statutory 
language over legislative history and statutory purposes by limiting the range of potentially
ambiguous sources to which judges can properly refer, textualists hope to ‘constrain the tendency
of judges to substitute their will for that of Congress.’” (quoting Eskridge, Jr., New Textualism,
supra note 47, at 674)). 
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choices. In other words, textualism in practice often involves just as 
much judicial discretion and guesswork as does purposivism.
Moreover, because the work that judicial discretion and speculation 
perform in the context of traditional textualist interpretive tools is 
largely hidden and unelaborated, the likelihood that textualist jurists 
will conflate their own policy preferences with those of Congress may
be intensified. 
Indeed, when textualist Justices infer congressional purpose or 
intent from textual canons or practical reasoning, the line between the 
inferred purpose and the Justices’ personal intuitions can be awfully 
blurry. After all, judgments about what Congress logically,
consistently, or rationally must have done are likely to bear a strong 
correlation to what seems logical, consistent, or rational to the Justice 
herself. Inferences about statutory purpose drawn from other 
interpretive tools—whether those tools are text based, like noscitur
and the whole act rule, or normative, like practical consequences— 
necessarily require some guesswork and dot-connecting that inevitably 
create space for subjective judgment. In this sense, textualists’ 
backdoor purposivism leaves just as much room for judicial discretion 
as traditional purposivist tools like legislative history, or the mischief 
that motivated Congress to enact a statute. Indeed, such backdoor 
references to purpose and intent may even create more space for 
judicial discretion than do traditional tools of purposive analysis— 
because whereas the traditional purposive tools tend to rely on 
external evidence such as the legislative record or documentation 
about the social problem Congress sought to redress, textualists’ 
backdoor purposivism relies on extrapolations from the statute’s text
that are often based on judges’ personal intuitions.  
Consider, for example, the noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis
canons, two traditional text-based canons. The empirical study of 
congressional drafting practices cited earlier found that although 
staffers were not familiar with these Latin canons by name, they
reported that the concepts underlying the canons accurately reflect 
how the terms in a statutory list relate to one another.216 This suggests 
that the noscitur and ejusdem canons may in fact be useful, accurate
guides to Congress’s intent; and I confess to being partial to them 
myself as interpretive aids. However, there are some important 
limitations to relying on noscitur and ejusdem as the exclusive
216. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 143, at 933.
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indicators of Congress’s purpose or intent. First, even if these canons 
accurately capture Congress’s practice of listing together items that 
share a common denominator, they leave significant room for judicial
discretion in articulating what that common denominator is. In fact, it
is common for majority and dissenting opinions in the same case to 
disagree about the common denominator that connects the items in a 
particular statutory list.217 Further, judges retain significant discretion
to articulate the common denominator that connects list items at 
whatever degree of generality they choose—and in so doing can 
control whether particular conduct is swept in or out of the statute’s 
coverage. This is precisely the same criticism that Justice Scalia has 
leveled against traditional purposive analysis.218 All of this means that
while noscitur a sociis or ejusdem generis may accurately reflect a
congressional choice to list together items that share a common
connecting feature, the canons cannot tell us clearly what that 
connecting feature is—or how broad or narrow it is.219 Not only are
noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis incapable, then, of eliminating 
judicial discretion—they may even invite it. 
Further, there is little indication that the whole act rule—also 
regularly used by the Roberts Court’s textualist Justices to infer 
congressional intent—accurately reflects congressional drafting 
practices or captures congressional purpose or intent. In fact, there is 
some compelling evidence that it does not.220 Moreover, like the 
noscitur and ejusdem canons, the whole act rule leaves significant room 
217. Dolan provides one such example. Compare Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 
486–87 (2006) (finding that the common denominator connecting the list terms “loss, miscarriage, 
or negligent transmission” in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b) is “failings in the postal obligation to deliver
mail in a timely manner to the right address”), with id. at 495 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the list term “negligent transmission” “encompass[es] more ground than the decidedly 
narrower terms ‘loss’ and ‘miscarriage’”). Yates provides another. Compare Yates v. United
States, 574 U.S. 528, 532 (2015) (plurality opinion) (holding that the common theme connecting 
“tangible object” with “record [or] document” in 18 U.S.C. § 1519 is objects “used to record or
preserve information”), with id. at 564 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (presenting the common theme as
“things that provide information, and thus potentially serve as evidence”).
 218. See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 26, at 18–19 (“The purposivist, who derives the 
meaning of text from purpose and not purpose from the meaning of text, is free to climb up this
ladder of purposes and to ‘fill in’ or change the text according to the level of generality he has
chosen.”); see also Easterbrook, What Does Legislative History Tell Us?, supra note 45, at 449
(“Shifting the level of generality—emphasizing the anticipated effects of a rule while slighting the
rule itself—is a method of liberating judges from rules.”). 
219. See supra Part III.A.
 220. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 143, at 906–08 (describing the results of a survey of 
congressional staffers regarding the drafting process). 
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for judicial discretion in application and, as the discussion of Dean v. 
United States in Part III demonstrated, majority and dissenting 
opinions regularly reach different interpretive conclusions while 
invoking the rule.221 
Practical-consequences-based reasoning, which textualist Justices 
also invoked regularly, is no more likely to cabin judicial discretion and
identify Congress’s true purpose or intent than are the language 
canons. On the contrary, practical reasoning is notoriously open-ended 
and dependent on the intuitions and judgment of the individual judge. 
As scholars have pointed out, what is absurd to one judge may be 
merely strange or unusual to another; and what is absurd to one or 
more judges may be completely reasonable, or a price worth paying, to 
members of Congress.222 For these reasons, it is difficult to conclude 
that textualists’ practice of deriving legislative intent and purpose via
other interpretive tools leads to a more accurate assessment of
Congress’s intent, or to less judicial discretion in defining that intent,
than do traditional purposive interpretive tools.
Ultimately, then, the Court’s textualist Justices may be doing the 
very thing they criticize purposivist Justices for—i.e., selecting 
statutory constructions that correlate with their own personal policy
views and assuming that Congress shares their perspective. In so doing, 
they may be engaging in an exercise that is reminiscent of Professors 
Hart and Sacks’s Legal Process school of thought, which presumed that
legislatures are composed of “reasonable persons pursuing reasonable 
purposes reasonably” and directed interpreters to identify a statute’s
purpose and then construe the statute to effectuate that purpose.223 
Although the textualist Justices on the Roberts Court do not typically 
begin with the statute’s purpose and extrapolate out from there, as 
Hart and Sacks advocated, they do assume that Congress is a rational 
actor and they do choose statutory readings that they believe will 
produce rational results. Moreover, like Hart and Sacks, they rely on
221. See supra Part III.B; see also Krishnakumar, Dueling Canons, supra note 75, at 967–71
(detailing numerous ways in which majority and dissenting opinions in the same case reach
different interpretations while both employing the whole act rule).
 222. See, e.g., Manning, Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 26, at 2431 (arguing that the absurdity
doctrine “risks disturbing the outcomes of the legislative process by ‘correcting’ wording that
Congress itself might have been unable—or at least unwilling—to correct”); Jonathan R. Siegel,
What Statutory Drafting Errors Teach Us About Statutory Interpretation, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
309, 326 (2001) (“[W]hat seems absurd to one judge may seem merely unexpected to another.”).
 223. HART & SACKS, supra note 21, at 1378. 
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their own individual intuitions and judgment to determine what is 
rational.
Textualists might offer several possible rejoinders to the 
suggestion that they are employing just as much (or more) judicial 
discretion and policy-driven decision-making as their purposivist 
counterparts. One such rejoinder is that textualist Justices are not 
actually placing much stock in congressional purpose or intent in these
cases—or even seeking to uncover Congress’s actual intent. That is, the 
Justices could simply be asserting consistency with congressional intent 
in order to bolster their claims that the interpretation they have chosen 
is the correct one. This explanation seems plausible in the context of 
the absurd-results cases in which the Justices simply insist that 
Congress must have—or could not have—intended a particular 
interpretation because that interpretation would produce illogical, 
anomalous, or otherwise unsound results. The work in those cases 
appears to be performed primarily by the Justices’ pragmatic 
reasoning, and the link to congressional intent could be made merely
to justify that pragmatic reasoning, rather than a serious attempt to 
discover and follow Congress’s likely intent.
However, in cases where textualist Justices assert that a particular 
interpretation cannot be correct because it would produce results that 
undermine a statute’s goals—for example, that the interpretation 
would allow “endless tolling” that is “out of step” with the general
purpose of statutes of limitations224—they seem to be doing more than 
merely nodding at legislative purpose to justify their reasoning. Rather, 
in such cases the text-oriented Justices seem to be attempting to uphold
what they perceive to be Congress’s actual purpose or policy goals.
Likewise, when textualist Justices rely on the noscitur a sociis and
ejusdem generis canons, they seem to be seeking the common thread or 
purpose that Congress actually had in mind when it chose the particular 
list words at issue, even if they fail to appreciate the discretion they are 
exercising in defining that common thread or purpose.  
A second possible counter is that in inferring congressional
purpose and intent through other interpretive tools, textualist Justices
are serving as the real faithful agents of the legislature. As noted 
earlier, many textualists take the view that the enacted text is the best 
available evidence of Congress’s intent and that close attention to the
224. See Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Simmonds, 566 U.S. 221, 227–28 (2012). 
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text is the only way to accurately effectuate that intent.225 Language 
canons such as noscitur a sociis and the whole act rule pay very close 
attention to the statute’s text; thus, using such canons to derive 
legislative purpose could be considered entirely consistent with 
textualist theory. That is, language canons and the whole act rule could
be viewed as quintessential mechanisms for using text as the “best
evidence” of the statute’s purpose or to identify the objective meaning 
that a “reasonably informed reader” would attribute to the statute. The 
problem with this argument, however, is that noscitur and ejusdem are
not neutral, objective guides to the one inevitably correct construction 
of a statutory term. Indeed, as the cases discussed in Part III 
demonstrate, the Justices regularly disagree over the relevant common 
denominator between list terms—with normative and policy 
considerations often appearing to tip the scales in one direction or 
another. In short, relying on noscitur and ejusdem is more than an 
exercise in straightforward textual analysis or identification of the 
inevitable objective meaning that a reasonable reader would attribute 
to a statutory term. Rather, it is an exercise in constructing a common 
denominator and, in so doing, speculating about Congress’s organizing 
purpose—in a manner similar to that called for by traditional purposive
analysis. The same critique applies to the whole act rule, which lacks 
the legitimating feature of reflecting Congress’s actual drafting
practices. 
In highlighting the above, this Article does not mean to suggest 
that textualist Justices engage in backdoor purposivism for nefarious 
reasons. In fact, it is possible that textualist jurists simply may not be 
fully cognizant, or deliberate, in their indirect construction of 
legislative purpose and intent when applying textual canons. Because
textualist Justices are backing into purposive inferences rather than 
looking for Congress’s intent and reasoning from the start, they may 
be somewhat unwitting about the role that purpose and intent are 
playing in their statutory constructions. When using the noscitur a
sociis and ejusdem generis canons, for example, the purposive analysis
conducted by the interpreter can be obscured or hidden: identifying a 
225. See supra note 27 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v.
Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 544 (2012) (“[T]he best evidence of Congress’s intent is the statutory 
text.”); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1480 
n.3 (1987) (noting that textualists can argue that text is “the best evidence of what the legislature
actually meant when it enacted the statute”); Carlos E. González, Reinterpreting Statutory 
Interpretation, 74 N.C. L. REV. 585, 597 (1996) (observing that some textualists look to statutory 
text as the best guide of legislative intent). 
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common denominator requires judges to think indirectly about what 
goal or aim Congress had in mind when it chose the terms in the list; it
does not force them to do so openly or conscientiously. As a result, the 
Justices may not be fully mindful of the fact that they are essentially
engaging in purpose-finding when they apply these canons. Rather, 
they may gesture at a perceived common thread connecting the list 
items at issue without giving thorough consideration to the larger
implications that common thread has for the statute’s purpose or 
considering how it fits into the larger picture.  
Textualists might also take issue with the suggestion that backdoor 
purposivism could allow for more judicial discretion than does 
consulting legislative history. Specifically, they might argue that the 
sheer volume of legislative history available for any given statute is 
such as to allow the Justices to cherry-pick statements that support 
their preferred interpretations and that reliance on legislative history 
thus affords Justices more leeway than reliance on textual canons and 
tools. This is a long-standing textualist criticism of legislative history.226 
In the end, whether one views legislative history or textual canons as 
posing the greater danger for expanding judicial discretion turns 
largely on how courts employ legislative history in practice. If judges 
use legislative history as an outcome-determinative tool, and if all
forms of legislative history—including statements by a bill’s 
opponents—are treated as equally authoritative and relevant, then 
legislative history may indeed provide judges with greater leeway to 
decide cases as they see fit. If, however, courts constrain their use of 
legislative history to a few highly relevant and authoritative forms, as
some scholars have recommended they do,227 or if judges treat 
226. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 16, at 36 (“In any major piece of legislation, the legislative
history is extensive, and there is something for everybody.”); Adrian Vermeule, Legislative
History and the Limits of Judicial Competence: The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN.
L. REV. 1833, 1874 (1998) (“If there is something for everyone in a legislative history, a judge may
select the material that suits his preconceptions even if the dominant tenor of the legislative
history, taken as a whole, fairly suggests a different result.” (footnote omitted)).
 227. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 222
(1994) (proposing a hierarchy of different forms of legislative history); George A. Costello,
Average Voting Members and Other “Benign Fictions”: The Relative Reliability of Committee
Reports, Floor Debates, and Other Sources of Legislative History, 1990 DUKE L.J. 39, 41–42 
(recounting the standard hierarchy); Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory 
Interpretation: Legislative History by the Rules, 122 YALE L.J. 70, 90–134 (2012) (advocating that
legislative history generated late in the enactment process should trump legislative history
generated before a bill reaches its final version, that statements made by a bill’s opponents should
not be cited at all, and that congressional rules should determine which legislative history is most 
relevant and authoritative).
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legislative history as merely a corroborative factor, rather than a 
definitive trump card in the interpretive analysis, then legislative 
history use may not expand judicial discretion nearly as much as 
textualists fear. 
Empirical evidence supports the latter, more constrained vision of 
legislative history use: as Table 3c shows, a majority of the 2005–2016 
term Roberts Court opinions that referenced legislative history did so
to corroborate a meaning arrived at through other interpretive
resources, rather than rely on such history as an independent or 
primary source of meaning. Further, the majority of the opinions in the
dataset (60.8 percent) that invoked legislative history referenced 
committee or conference-committee reports, which do not lend
themselves to cherry-picking as easily as statements made by individual
legislators or testimony provided by interested parties with competing
views. Indeed, only a handful of the opinions in the dataset referenced 
floor statements, testimony provided at committee hearings, or other, 
less authoritative and manipulable forms of legislative history.228 
In addition, my earlier “dueling canons” study of the extent to 
which majority and dissenting opinions invoke the same interpretive 
tools to reach different statutory constructions found that the members 
of the Roberts Court employed competing, contradictory references to 
legislative history in less than one-fifth of the cases (17.6 percent) in 
which they invoked legislative history. This rate is roughly equal to the 
rate at which they employed competing references to dictionary 
definitions, the whole act rule, or language canons, and is lower than 
the rate at which they employed competing references to other similar 
statutes, the statute’s plain meaning, and analogous precedents.229 
228. There were 227 opinions in the dataset that referenced one or more kinds of legislative 
history. Several of these opinions cited more than one kind of legislative history. The percentage
of opinions in which different legislative history types were cited was as follows: 60.8 percent 
referred to committee or conference committee reports; 23.8 percent made inferences about the 
statute’s meaning based on how it evolved from its initial proposal to its final version—a form of
legislative history that even the most ardent textualists, including Justice Scalia, find
unproblematic; 9.7 percent referred to floor statements or debates—and more than half of these
opinions also referenced other forms of legislative history, most typically committee reports; 9.3
percent referred to hearings—and again, more than half of these opinions also referenced other
forms of legislative history, especially committee reports; 6.6 percent referred to the absence of
legislative action and/or invoked the “dog that did not bark” canon; and 9.3 percent referenced
other forms of legislation, including rejected proposals and reports issued by administrative agencies.
 229. Krishnakumar, Dueling Canons, supra note 75, at 929 tbl.1. That study found that judicial
dueling—where majority or concurring opinions employ the same interpretive tool as a dissenting
opinion in the same case but reach opposing statutory constructions—occurred in 18.2 percent of
the cases in which at least one opinion cited dictionary definitions, 14.1 percent of cases in which
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Overall, the data suggest that the Court’s recent on-the-ground use of 
legislative history as an interpretive tool has been significantly more
restrained than the picture of an unbridled, legislative history free-for-
all that textualists long have painted.
Table 3c 
Manner in which Legislative History was Employed 
(in Opinions that Referenced Internal230 Legislative History) 
2005–2016 Terms (n=170) 






















Part Concurring / Part 0.6%
Dissenting (n=1)
Finally, textualists might counter that even if their interpretive 
approach does not cabin judicial discretion better than a purposivist 
one, it is nevertheless preferable for formalist reasons. That is, because 
only the text duly enacted by both houses of Congress and signed by 
the president is the law, efforts to interpret statutes in light of
at least one opinion invoked the whole act/language canons, 25.3 percent of the cases in which at 
least one opinion cited plain meaning; 32.6 percent of the cases in which at least one opinion
referenced precedent, and 21.1 percent of the cases in which at least one opinion cited other
statutes. Id.
230. This Table does not include 42 opinions that discussed how a statute evolved over time,
from one version to the next. References to that “evolution of the statute” form of legislative
history were coded separately from references to statements in the legislative record reflecting
the views of drafters and other legislators as expressed in committee reports, floor statements,
and the like.
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Congress’s actual purpose or intent are arguably illegitimate, whereas 
efforts to infer meaning directly from the statute’s text are
appropriate.231 However, as the doctrinal analysis in Part III shows,
inferring meaning from the statute’s text is not the straightforward, 
mechanical task that textualism often makes it out to be. Nor is it one
that tends to be constrained by the statute’s text. Indeed, it is 
essentially impossible to apply the whole act rule, noscitur a sociis, or 
ejusdem generis canons without venturing beyond, or adding 
something external to, the duly enacted statutory text. Thus, a formalist 
emphasis on the enacted text often winds up privileging judicial 
inferences and guesswork that did not go through bicameralism and
presentment and that—unlike legislative history—bear no direct 
connection to the process by which the statute was enacted.
In the end, whether textualist Justices evoke statutory purpose
and intent wittingly or unwittingly, these concepts are playing a 
nontrivial role in the Justices’ statutory constructions. This matters for 
two reasons. First, it highlights a glaring disconnect between 
textualism’s rhetoric and its actual practice, in keeping with earlier 
studies.232 Second, and more importantly, because textualist Justices
refuse to consult external sources—such as the background mischief 
leading to a statute’s enactment, or the legislative record—their 
presumptions about purpose and intent may be more prone to reflect 
individual Justices’ personal biases than are their purposivist 
counterparts’ attempts to identify a statute’s purpose. The next two
sections explore these concerns in detail.
B. Hidden Normative Baselines 
One upshot of the finding that supposedly neutral, objective 
textualist tools such as noscitur a sociis and the whole act rule leave
231. See, e.g., Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The law
as it passed is the will of the majority of both houses, and the only mode in which that will is 
spoken is in the act itself . . . .” (omission in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Aldridge v.
Williams, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 9, 15 (1845))); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 453 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (explaining that enacted text always trumps “unenacted legislative 
intent”); Easterbrook, Original Intent, supra note 41, at 64–65 (“[T]he whole process of
interpretation from intent is an end run around process. It is a translation from intent to law that 
we would find repulsive if proposed explicitly.”).
 232. See, e.g., McGowan, supra note 13, at 175 (explaining that Justice Scalia often made
consequentialist arguments in his dissents); Schacter, Confounding Common Law, supra note 12,
at 19–22 (describing how the Court’s originalism relies on common law principles); Schacter, Text
or Consequences?, supra note 13, at 1009–15 (discussing “[t]extualism’s consequentialist
tendencies”).







   
 
 










1340 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:1275 
significant room for judicial discretion is that textualist Justices may
conflate their own normative policy preferences with Congress’s 
purpose or intent, just as they accuse purposivists of doing. We saw this 
in Dean v. United States, discussed in Part III.B, where Chief Justice 
Roberts’s textual-canon-based argument tracked closely with an 
underlying normative judgment that the defendant’s behavior was 
highly culpable and worthy of enhanced punishment, while Justice 
Stevens’s whole-act-rule-supplemented-by-purpose-and-legislative-
history construction tracked his underlying normative judgment that 
the accidental discharge of a gun was not so blameworthy and did not
justify a sentencing enhancement.  
This was also the case in King v. Burwell, which raised the question 
whether the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) authorizes the payment of 
health-insurance subsidies to qualified individuals who purchase health
insurance through an exchange established by the federal
government.233 The relevant statutory provision makes such subsidies 
available to qualified individuals who purchase insurance on “an
exchange established by the State.”234 Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion
for the Court used numerous whole-act-rule arguments, as well as 
openly purposive references to the mischief the statute was designed
to address, to insist that the only sensible reading of the ACA was that 
the tax credits must apply to exchanges established by the federal 
government. Notably, the opinion began by discussing the evolution of 
health-insurance regulation in several states during the 1990s,
explaining that the precursors to the ACA “were designed to” pursue 
the “goal” of expanding health-insurance coverage by, among other 
things, providing subsidies to people of limited means who were legally 
obligated to purchase insurance.235 The opinion then noted that a
statutory construction which reads “established by the State” to limit 
insurance subsidies to those who purchased insurance only on state 
exchanges would contradict other provisions of the statute that
“assume” subsidies will flow to health-care markets established by the 
federal government236 and require that all exchanges “make available
qualified health plans to qualified individuals.”237 
233. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2485 (2015).
 234. Id. at 2487 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)–(c)). 
235. Id. at 2485–86. 
236. Id. at 2491–92. 
237. Id. at 2490 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(2)(A)). 
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Justice Scalia and the other textualist and textualist-leaning 
Justices dissented, marshaling plain meaning and whole-act-rule
arguments to insist that the relevant tax-credit provision must be read 
to apply only to exchanges established by state governments.238 The
dissent argued, for example, that it should “be obvious” that someone
who buys insurance on an exchange established by the federal 
government does not receive tax credits239 and that “[i]t is hard to come
up with a clearer way to limit tax credits to state Exchanges than to use 
the words ‘established by the State.’”240 It also noted that “other parts 
of the Act sharply distinguish between the establishment of an 
Exchange by a State and the establishment of an Exchange by the
Federal Government”241 and complained that “[w]ords no longer have 
meaning if an Exchange that is not established by a State is ‘established
by the State.’”242 
Despite its close attention to text and ordinary meaning, however, 
Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion gives the impression of being about 
more than just the meaning of the phrase “Exchange established by the
State.” Indeed, the opinion’s scathing textual analysis243 reflects an 
underlying hostility toward the ACA and a normative preference for 
invalidating the statute. Likewise, although technical and purposive 
arguments received prime billing in Chief Justice Roberts’s majority 
opinion, that opinion also conveyed a powerful normative preference 
for upholding Congress’s work product.244 Similar normative baselines 
undergird other opinions that appear strictly textualist on their face.245 
I am hardly the first to note that textualist opinions often reflect 
their authors’ underlying normative preferences. Indeed, Professor Bill 
Eskridge has argued that the textual canons cannot be applied without 
some normative baseline, and that even the strictest textual opinion 
238. Id. at 2499 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
239. Id. at 2496. 
240. Id. at 2497. 
241. Id. at 2498. 
242. Id. at 2497. 
243. See, e.g., id. (“Impossible possibility, thy name is an opinion on the Affordable Care 
Act!”); id. (“Today’s interpretation is not merely unnatural; it is unheard of.”); id. at 2502 
(referring to the majority’s opinion as “interpretive jiggery-pokery”). 
244. See, e.g., id. at 2496 (majority opinion) (“[W]e must respect the role of the Legislature,
and take care not to undo what it has done.”).
 245. See, e.g., James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 215–16, 219 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(citing due process and ease-of-administrability concerns as factors influencing the selection of an
ejusdem generis common denominator).
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ultimately rests on some normative underpinning.246 Based on my
findings at this stage, I would not go so far as to say that every
application of textual canons is at bottom normative. But I would
certainly agree that the textual canons do not constrain or prevent the 
Justices from importing their own normative preferences into their 
statutory constructions. Moreover, the aura of neutrality currently
associated with the language canons in particular tends to mask the
work that normative preferences and judicial discretion play in
textualist Justices’ statutory interpretations. As Professor Dan Kahan
has shown in a series of articles, human beings—including judges—are 
demonstrably poor at recognizing when their perceptions of fact are
being motivated or shaped by their preexisting values or normative
commitments.247 This can lead to a form of “decision-making hubris”
which assumes that the decision-maker’s perception constitutes the 
single, inevitably correct perception.248 This Article’s aim is to bring to 
light the discretion and normativity inherent in textualist Justices’ use
of practical reasoning, language canons, and the like, so that that
discretion and normativity can be properly acknowledged—and
perhaps checked against other interpretive resources. 
C. What (Really) Divides Textualists and Purposivists? 
As the data reported in Part II demonstrate, the textualist Justices 
on the Roberts Court regularly construct indirect purpose and intent 
arguments through other interpretive tools, including some that are not 
246. See Eskridge, Jr., Normative Canons, supra note 81, at 552 (contending Scalia and
Garner’s preferred canons demand normative judgments and leave significant room for judicial
discretion). Eskridge also comments that many of Scalia and Garner’s approved canons require
judicial judgments about statutory purpose, although his discussion of the language canons is
limited to noscitur and expressio unius and focuses on the discretion these canons confer; he does
not argue that textualists actually use language canons to impute statutory purpose and intent. Id. 
at 576–78. 
247. See Dan M. Kahan et al., “They Saw a Protest”: Cognitive Illiberalism and the Speech-
Conduct Distinction, 64 STAN. L. REV. 851, 883–85 (2012) (describing the results of an experiment
in which groups with different normative commitments drew opposing conclusions from an
identical video of demonstrators protesting); Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, The Self-
Defensive Cognition of Self-Defense, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 44–46 (2008) (similar); see also
Robert J. Robinson, Dacher Keltner, Andrew Ward & Lee Ross, Actual Versus Assumed 
Differences in Construal: “Naive Realism” in Intergroup Perception and Conflict, 68 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 404, 414–16 (1995) (describing the results of a study examining 
the social construal of partisan issues). 
248. See Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going 
To Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 841– 
42 (2009) (describing the results of an experiment in which different cultural groups drew
markedly different conclusions after viewing identical video footage of a police car chase).
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text or canon based. Moreover, they exercise significant judicial 
discretion and normative judgment even when employing supposedly 
“rule-based” textual canons and tools. At the same time, the Court’s 
purposivist Justices regularly weave textual, whole act rule, and
language-canon arguments together with statutory purpose and intent. 
In addition, the data reported in Tables 1 and 2 show that none of the 
Justices are purely textualist or purposivist in practice: all of the 
Justices referenced all of the interpretive resources in at least some of 
the opinions they authored and even Justices Scalia and Thomas
employed atextual tools such as purpose and practical consequences at 
noteworthy rates. This suggests that perhaps there is less that actually 
divides textualists and purposivists than most scholars have 
recognized—and not just because purposivists have embraced textual
analysis, but also because textualists have quietly been employing 
atextual interpretive tools and engaging in backdoor purposivism. In 
light of this finding scholars should consider reconceptualizing the 
theoretical approaches taken by the Justices as falling along a 
continuum, with some Justices closer to the textualist end, others closer 
to the purposivist end, and still others falling in between. 
The question thus arises: Are there any meaningful differences left 
between textualism and purposivism as practiced on the ground? Does 
the order in which judges arrive at purpose and intent—beginning the 
interpretive inquiry with these concepts in mind and addressing them 
directly versus backing into them and addressing them only
indirectly—make a noteworthy difference in the judicial interpretation 
of statutes? Are these differences that judges and scholars should care
about? Or should we just throw up our hands and declare that 
textualists and purposivists are essentially on the same page—both
paying attention to Congress’s purpose and intent, after all—and quit 
there?
Ultimately, I think these differences do matter, and are important, 
for several reasons. First, textualist Justices often do not acknowledge
that they are imputing purpose or intent to Congress—which increases 
the likelihood that they will conflate their own intuitions about the 
statute’s aims with the legislature’s. This danger seems particularly 
acute when textualist Justices use the whole act rule or language canons
such as noscitur a sociis to infer purpose, because in such cases, the 
Justices tend to couch their comments about purpose and intent in
terms of what the statute’s structure inexorably dictates, without 
acknowledging that there may be more than one plausible purpose or 
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intent that could be inferred from the structure.249 In other words, they 
convey—and may believe—that they are reaching the inevitable 
conclusion that the textual canons dictate, without recognizing and 
accounting for the role that personal intuition or speculation is playing.
Second, because textualist Justices refuse to consult external sources— 
such as the mischief leading to a statute’s enactment or the legislative
record—their assumptions about the statute’s purpose and intent may
reflect individual Justices’ gut reactions without the sobering check of 
independent, external clues. In this sense, textualist and textualist-
leaning Justices’ estimations of legislative purpose and intent could be
even more prone to reflect individual biases than are their purposivist 
counterparts’ estimations of legislative purpose and intent—because 
purposivist Justices’ estimations are at least tethered to a written 
legislative record created by legislators and external to themselves.250 
The argument that purposivist Justices’ search for legislative
purpose and intent is not as dangerous as textualists paint it to be 
because purposivist Justices are cabined by their reliance on a written 
record created by others is not new.251 What is new is the recognition
that the textualist Justices are engaging in a similar, although perhaps 
unwitting, search for legislative purpose and intent—and that they are
doing so through neutral interpretive tools that give the appearance of
providing an objective, discretion-free guide to statutory meaning.
That is, in at least some nontrivial subset of the statutory cases that 
come before them, textualist and textualist-leaning Justices are not 
merely following textual canons and tools to their logical, inevitable 
outcomes, but are speculating and making inferences about 
congressional purpose and intent in the course of applying textualist 
249. See, e.g., Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568, 572–73 (2009) (mechanically applying the
whole act rule and passive-voice arguments); Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 487 (2006)
(treating the common theme of “failings in the postal obligation to deliver mail” as inevitable);
cf. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 26, at 6 (“[M]ost interpretive questions have a right answer. 
Variability in interpretation is a distemper.” (footnote omitted)). 
250. Cf. James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Liberal Justices’ Reliance on Legislative History:
Principle, Strategy, and the Scalia Effect, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 117, 138–41 (2008)
(reporting that liberal Justices relying on legislative history in employment law cases tend to find
in favor of employers—against their ideological preferences—more often than when they do not
use legislative history).
 251. See, e.g., John Paul Stevens, Judicial Predilections, 6 NEV. L.J. 1, 1–2 (2005) (“I believe 
judges are more, rather than less, constrained when we make ourselves accountable to all reliable
evidence of legislative intent.”); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, the Unknown
Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1509, 1548–49 (1998) (“[T]he new textualist is less responsive to
democratic desires than the faithful agent, . . . who tries to figure out what the principal would
have her do under the circumstances.”).
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tools to particular statutes. Also new is the finding that not only do
textualist Justices invoke practical consequences in one-third of the 
opinions they author, but they speculate about legislative intent and
purpose in so doing, further blurring the lines between their own
intuitions and judgments and those of the legislature.  
Once we realize that textualist Justices are making inferences 
about purpose and intent too—even when using textual canons—the
question becomes: Do we want them to do so without checking their 
inferences against available evidence of Congress’s actual intent?
Much of the theoretical debate so far has focused on the use of 
legislative history as a dispositive trump card that provides conclusive
evidence of legislators’ subjective intent and the use of such legislative
history to contradict a statute’s clear text. This, however, is a false 
dichotomy—or at least the wrong debate to be having at this point. 
Textualism has successfully highlighted the limits of relying on 
legislative history in a dispositive, text-defeating manner, and the
members of the Roberts Court rarely seek to invoke legislative history 
in this manner. Indeed, as Table 3c shows, the majority of legislative
history references in the modern Supreme Court are corroborative in
nature.252 Moreover, a close examination of the 117 opinions in the 
dataset in which a majority or ancillary opinion relied on legislative
history, rather than merely used legislative history to corroborate, 
reveals that only 23 opinions (19.7 percent) arguably can be said to 
employ legislative history in a manner that contradicts the statute’s 
plain meaning.253 
252. See infra Table 3c (reporting that during the 2005–2016 terms, over 55 percent of the 
Roberts Court’s references to the legislative record, or “internal” legislative history, were of a
corroborative nature); see also James J. Brudney, Confirmatory Legislative History, 76 BROOK.
L. REV. 901, 901–02 (2011) (“On numerous occasions since 2006, the Roberts Court has invoked
legislative history as a confirmatory asset.”).
253. The 23 opinions were as follows: Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 136 S. Ct. 1581 (2016);
Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015); Oneok, Inc.
v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591 (2015); Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys.
Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015); Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528 (2015); Abramski v.
United States, 573 U.S. 169 (2014); Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 573 U.S. 302
(2014) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Hall v. United States, 566 U.S. 506
(2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582 (2011)
(Breyer, J., dissenting); Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009)
(Breyer, J., concurring); Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting); Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303 (2009);
Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One 
v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009); Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214 (2008) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting); CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442 (2008); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 
U.S. 312 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 551 U.S.
224 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81 
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In other words, the Court typically cites legislative history to 
confirm a statutory construction it has arrived at through other, more
textual, interpretive tools—not as the driving factor in interpreting a 
statute, and not in the face of clearly contradictory statutory text. 
Given that reality, the debate going forward should be about whether
those jurists who practice a pure form of textualism should continue to 
reject all legislative history use as illegitimate or whether they should
be willing to check their backdoor inferences about the organizing 
purpose behind a statutory list or the intent reflected in the legislature’s 
structural choices against record evidence of the legislature’s intent. 
For a number of reasons, I think it preferable that all judges— 
textualist and purposivist alike—check their inferences about
legislative intent and purpose against as many external sources as 
possible, including the legislative record. In other words, purposivists 
should use textual canons such as the whole act rule, noscitur, and 
grammar rules to check the inferences they draw from legislative
history or the circumstances surrounding a statute’s enactment; and
textualists likewise should use legislative history and the circumstances 
leading to a statute’s enactment to check inferences they arrive at 
through the use of traditional textualist tools.  
This approach would help correct for biases that all interpreters 
are subject to. As Professor Victoria Nourse has powerfully highlighted
in her book, Misreading Law, Misreading Democracy, the human mind
is prone to certain cognitive biases that are often implicit and unknown 
to us.254 One of these is the “focusing illusion,” which refers to the fact 
that when the mind focuses on one particular element of a situation, it 
risks overvaluing that element and undervaluing the surrounding 
context or competing explanations.255 As Nourse explains, the lesson
from the cognitive-bias research is that we should resist stopping at a 
single bit of information and should instead look for disconfirming
information—information that could falsify our initial impressions.256 
Legislative history, or other evidence from the legislative record, as 
(2007); Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291 (2006) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting); Howard Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 547 U.S. 651 (2006); Rapanos v.
United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
254. See VICTORIA NOURSE, MISREADING LAW, MISREADING DEMOCRACY 116–24 (2016)
(describing research on “bounded rationality,” “bounded awareness,” and related concepts of
“focusing illusion” and “fast-thinking,” which illuminate our minds’ tendency to believe that what
we see or focus on is all there is and to ignore our own implicit biases). 
255. Id. at 118–19. 
256. Id. at 122.
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Nourse argues, can serve as powerful disconfirming evidence for a 
judge’s gut instincts about a statute’s meaning—or, I submit, for a
judge’s inferences about how different terms in a statutory list fit 
together, or what the legislature’s structural choices mean.257 
I am not suggesting, as Nourse does, that judges necessarily must 
treat legislative history as superior to text-based canons like noscitur, 
but only that courts and individual Justices should not stop their 
interpretive inquiry after applying text-based canons. Instead, they 
should consult the legislative record or the background circumstances,
often referred to as the “mischief,” that led to the statute’s enactment
to check whether the inferences they have drawn from text-based
canons are incorrect or “disconfirmed.” If the legislative record and
background mischief reveal nothing that contradicts the inferences 
drawn by the court, then the court should feel comfortable interpreting 
the statute in light of its initial inferences; but if the legislative record
suggests a different organizing purpose—and therefore a different 
common denominator or structural inference than the one surmised by
the court—then the court should revise its inferred common
denominator or structural conclusion accordingly.
A second reason to prefer that jurists check their text-based 
inferences about purpose and intent against the legislative record is 
one first suggested by Professors Bill Eskridge and Philip Frickey 
several years ago: the metaphor of the chain versus the cable.258 
Drawing on a concept discussed by pragmatist philosopher Charles 
Peirce, Eskridge and Frickey noted that chains are no stronger than 
their weakest links because a break in any single link will cause a break 
in the chain as a whole. By contrast, cables, which depend on the 
cumulative strength of several threads woven together, can withstand 
a break in an individual thread.259 Legal arguments, they contend, are 
most successful when they are cable-like, weaving together numerous 
interpretive resources.260 Each individual interpretive tool—or 
thread—standing alone may be subject to quarrel and objection, but 
the cable woven from numerous such tools pointing in the same 
257. See id. at 122–23 (“Focalism’s lesson is that one must resist stopping at a single bit of 
information—a word or a phrase, let us say—stamping it as plain and ending the analysis.”).
258. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical 
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 351 (1990).
 259. Id.
 260. Id.
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direction is difficult to quarrel with or break.261 Likewise, a statutory
construction based on textual cues, and inferences about those cues 
that are backed up by components of the legislative record, will be
stronger than one based only on textual cues or only on inferences 
drawn from the Justices’ intuitions.  
The noscitur a sociis, ejusdem generis, and whole act canons are
important and valuable tools in the construction of statutes; and I do
not mean to suggest that judges should stop using them—although 
greater caution may be warranted with respect to the whole act rule
given its tension with the messy, chaotic process by which statutes are 
drafted.262 But when such canons are employed, it is important that 
courts and commentators recognize the discretion and room for 
judicial guesswork these seemingly mechanical linguistic canons 
inevitably invite. And given that discretion and guesswork, this Article 
submits that when employing such canons and textual tools, jurists 
should check whether anything in the legislative record supports or
contradicts the statutory readings they arrive at. Indeed, I would 
advocate that judges check their statutory constructions against the
legislative record even when the statute’s text appears, in their view, to 
have a plain meaning.263 If the legislative record contains nothing on
point or nothing that contradicts the reading arrived at through the use 
of language canons, then the court should stick with that reading. But 
if there is something on point in the legislative record, then courts 
should pay attention to that evidence to help give scope to the statutory 
list or structure. The same goes for practical-consequences-based
judicial reasoning in statutory cases; indeed it is especially important
that judges check their practical reasoning against the legislative record 
because such reasoning is untethered to the statute’s text, unlike
261. Id. The principle of “total evidence” for rational actors similarly recommends the use of
all available evidence. See I.J. Good, On the Principle of Total Evidence, 17 BRIT. J. PHIL. SCI. 
319, 319 (1967).
 262. See supra notes 162–64 and accompanying text.
263. While such a practice may appear, at first glance, to impose significant efficiency costs by
expanding the universe of cases in which courts must examine legislative history, in practice such
efficiency costs are likely to be minimal. This is because litigants who file briefs in statutory cases
tend to conduct legislative history research and bring relevant legislative history to the court’s
attention even in cases where the text seems clear—because they cannot predict whether the 
judge assigned to their case will find the textual arguments convincing or will be interested in what
the legislative history says. As a result, courts already tend to be briefed on legislative history as
well as textual arguments in cases where the legislative history is relevant, and the only additional
costs likely to be generated by this Article’s recommendations should involve the additional time
spent discussing legislative history in the courts’ opinions.
















   
    
   
    
2020] BACKDOOR PURPOSIVISM 1349 
inferences based on the noscitur a sociis canon or the whole act rule. 
As a result, it is even more imperative that such practical reasoning fit 
with legislative-record evidence if available.
To illustrate how this approach might work, let us conclude by 
reconsidering how two cases discussed in Part III might have fared if 
textualist or textualist-leaning Justices had checked their application of 
the noscitur a sociis or whole-act-rule canons against available
legislative history. Recall Dolan v. United States Postal Service, which
involved an FTCA exemption that barred “[a]ny claim arising out of 
the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal 
matter.”264 The majority opinion relied in part on a noscitur a sociis
argument, concluding that the common denominator connecting the 
list terms was “damages and delay of the postal material itself” and that 
the statutory exemption therefore did not extend to the negligent
placement of a package that caused physical injury to a postal 
customer.265 Significantly, the legislative record for the FTCA 
contained material that supported this inference about the statute’s
scope and that could have been used to confirm the Court’s reading 
and to discredit Justice Thomas’s and the Third Circuit’s broad reading 
of “negligent transmission.” First, a committee report stated that the
purpose of the FTCA exception was to exclude “certain classes of 
claims for which satisfactory relief is available under existing law.”266 
Second, testimony by Alexander Holtzoff, an executive branch official 
heavily involved in drafting the FTCA, explained that “[e]very person 
who sends a piece of postal matter can protect himself by registering it, 
as provided by the postal laws and regulations.”267 This legislative 
history made clear that ample remedies already existed to protect 
customers whose mail is lost, including insurance and registration— 
thus there was no need for an FTCA waiver allowing suits against the
government in such cases. I submit that Justice Kennedy’s opinion, and 
the common attribute he identified, would have been even more
compelling if it had referenced this legislative-record evidence as 
corroboration for his noscitur a sociis argument. 
264. Dolan v. United States Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 485 (2006) (alteration in original)
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b)).
 265. Id. at 486 (quoting Raila v. United States, 355 F.3d 118, 121 (2d Cir. 2004)). 
266. H.R. REP. NO. 69-206, at 4 (1926).
 267. Tort Claims Against the United States: Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 76th Cong. 38 (1940) (statement of Alexander Holtzoff, Special Assistant to the
Attorney General). 
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Let us also reconsider Yates v. United States. Recall that Justice
Ginsburg’s plurality opinion relied significantly on the noscitur a sociis
canon as well as the whole act rule to conclude that the phrase “record, 
document, or tangible object” did not cover “fish” because the 
provision encompassed only objects that can be used to record or 
preserve information.268 Justice Alito’s concurring opinion similarly
relied on the noscitur and ejusdem canons to conclude that only objects 
capable of being filed are “tangible object[s].”269 By contrast, Justice
Kagan’s decidedly textualist opinion,270 joined by archtextualist 
Justices Scalia and Thomas, found that the “laundry list of verbs” in 
the relevant provision—“alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers 
up, falsifies, or makes a false entry”—“shows that Congress wrote a
statute with a wide scope.”271 In the textualist dissent’s view, those
surrounding words “are supposed to ensure” that the provision “covers
the whole world of evidence-tampering, in all its prodigious variety.”272 
As it turns out, there was powerful legislative-record evidence that
supported the plurality’s and Justice Alito’s readings and called Justice
Kagan’s reading into question. A Senate Judiciary Committee report
observed that the provision at issue was enacted to “capture[] a small 
category of criminal acts which are not currently covered under 
existing laws—for example, acts of destruction committed by an 
individual acting alone and with the intent to obstruct a future criminal 
investigation” and expressed “concern that section 1519 . . . could be
interpreted more broadly than we intend.”273 An amicus brief 
submitted by Senator Oxley, the statute’s cosponsor, similarly
emphasized that Congress intended the provision to operate “as a 
scalpel” rather than “a hatchet”274 and explained that in order to avoid 
overbroad application of the criminal laws, Congress chose to legislate 
268. See supra notes 126–33 and accompanying text.
 269. See supra notes 134–37 and accompanying text.
270. Many commentators have characterized the opinion as “textualist.” See, e.g., John M.
Garvin, Intangible Fish and the Gulf of Understanding: Yates v. United States and the Court’s
Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 92 IND. L.J. SUPPLEMENT 77, 80 (2016) (“Justice Kagan’s
dissent hews closely to the textualist approach more typically associated with the other dissenting 
Justices . . . .”); Note, The Rise of Purposivism and Fall of Chevron: Major Statutory Cases in the
Supreme Court, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1227, 1237 (2017) (noting that Justice Kagan dissented “on 
textualist grounds”).
271. Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 555–56 (2015) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
 272. Id. at 556.
 273. S. REP. NO. 107-46, pt. VIII, at 27 (2002). 
274. Brief for the Honorable Michael Oxley as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 21,
Yates, 574 U.S. 528 (No. 13-7451). 
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against specific kinds of fraud separately, passing independent laws for 
health-care fraud, securities fraud, computer fraud, and accounting
fraud. In this vein, the provision at issue was directed specifically at 
accountants and lawyers and was not a general evidence-tampering 
statute applicable to destruction of all evidence of any kind.275 Oxley’s 
explanation was supported by the floor statements of Senator Leahy, 
the author of § 1519, who stated that the provision “closes loopholes 
and toughens penalties for shredding documents as we learned had 
occurred at Arthur Andersen.”276 Again, explicit reference to this 
legislative-record material would have lent considerable weight to
Justice Ginsburg’s construction of the statute and powerfully refuted 
Justice Kagan’s competing argument that the statute was designed to 
cover “the whole world of evidence-tampering.”277 
Justice Ginsburg’s decision not to foreground this legislative 
history is itself a testament to how modern purposivism has adjusted to 
the textualist revolution. While we can only speculate, it seems 
probable that she refrained from citing the legislative history more
prominently in order to avoid a backlash from the Court’s textualist 
Justices. Resting her opinion on noscitur a sociis, the whole act rule, 
and the obvious Enron-related impetus for the statute may have 
seemed the less controversial and more unassailable approach. But I 
submit that it is not the ideal approach. Instead, on-point legislative 
materials should be used to check, or disconfirm, inferences based on
textual canons (and vice-versa). 
Ultimately, this Article’s aim in highlighting textualist Justices’
surprising tendency to make indirect assumptions about purpose and 
intent—and the extent to which canons such as noscitur a sociis invite 
such purpose and intent inferences—is not to undermine the use of
textual canons or to suggest that they be abandoned in favor of 
legislative history references. In fact, I am a fan of the noscitur a sociis
and ejusdem generis canons, in part because these canons are closely 
tied to Congress’s choice of words and appear to reflect how 
congressional drafters actually think about statutory lists.278 This 
Article’s goal, instead, has been to: (1) underscore the extent to which 
275. Id. at 8.
 276. 148 CONG. REC. S6767 (daily ed. July 9, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
 277. Yates, 574 U.S. at 556 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
278. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 143, at 933 (describing a survey where 71 percent of 
137 congressional staffers believed that “terms in a statutory list always or often relate to one
another”).
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textual canons that have long been heralded as objective, neutral
formulas which lead inexorably to the one correct reading of a statute
have in practice proved to entail judicial discretion and presumptions 
about legislative purpose and intent; and (2) suggest that these textual 
canons therefore should not operate in isolation, but should be checked
against other available evidence of legislative purpose and intent. Put 
differently, this Article suggests that employing textual canons and 
their corollary inferences without more gives judges significant leeway 
to construct statutory purpose and significant opportunity to get that
statutory purpose wrong. To minimize that danger, judges should look 
to external evidence of legislative purpose and intent to help define the
scope of the common denominator connecting items in a statutory list 
or to confirm that the inferences they draw from a statute’s structure
are not off base. In other words, the textual canons should be used in 
tandem with the purposive tools rather than in isolation. 
CONCLUSION
This Article has sought to shed light on the underappreciated 
manner in which textualist and textualist-leaning Justices indirectly 
invoke the decidedly nontextualist concepts of legislative purpose, 
policy sensibility, and specific legislative intent in the statutory
opinions they author. It argues that some of the most popular textual
canons either inherently invite judicial guesswork about legislative 
policy objectives or have been used by textualist Justices to speculate 
about legislative purpose and intent. Moreover, it suggests that 
textualist Justices’ indirect, backdoor use of other interpretive tools to
impute legislative purpose and intent entails at least as much judicial 
discretion and room for normative decision-making as the more 
straightforward, traditional purposive mode of analysis that textualism
decries. Ultimately, the Article suggests that there may be less dividing 
textualism from purposivism than scholars or jurists have appreciated 
and that practitioners of all interpretive philosophies can enhance their 
efforts to arrive at an unbiased, accurate statutory reading by
expanding the universe of interpretive tools they are willing to 
consider—and seeking to check, or disconfirm, their initial interpretive
conclusion. 
